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From 1945 to 1949, Indonesian nationalists struggled 
for independence against their Dutch colonial rulers. For 
most of the period, American foreign policy favored the 
Netherlands in its desire to reign once again over the 
archipelago. American foreign policy strategy advocated a 
"Europe first" position, and possessed finite resources to 
contain Soviet expansion in the developing cold war. State 
Department policy planners sided with European powers as 
they attempted to resume the status quo ante in Southeast 
Asia following World War II. Colonies were considered 
essential to the recoveries of Western European powers 
economically, politically, and psychologically. 
While the American cold war strategy worked to 
stabilize Western Europe against Soviet advances, it 
resulted in negative affects in Asia in general and 
Indonesia in particular. Much goodwill toward the United 
States, easily obtained from Asian nationalists who desired 
to follow American principles, evaporated as the American 
anti-colonial position announced during World War II turned 
hollow in its aftermath. 
Yet an examination of Department of State Records, as 
well as the papers of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., former 
Secretary of State during the Truman administration, and 
Frank Graham, American representative to the United Nations 
committee to negotiate Indonesian independence, does not 
yield a united American front that was blind to Asian 
nationalism and determined to allow the pre-World War II 
status quo. Rather, debate over American policy was heated 
and prolonged. American officials were well aware of many 
of the potential negative consequences of their policy. As 
fighting erupted twice in Indonesia in the late 1940s and 
all exports of Indonesian natural resources to Europe 
stopped, American foreign policy shifted away from 
supporting the Netherlands in favor of the Indonesian 
nationalists. Dutch attempts at regaining control of 
Indonesia threatened the European Recovery Program by both 
exhausting the limited resources of the Netherlands in a 
protracted colonial war, and prompting anti-Dutch 
legislation in the United States Senate that imperiled all 
Marshall Plan aid for Western Europe. 
To their credit, American policy makers were flexible 
enough to shift to supporting Indonesian nationalism. 
Pressure on the Dutch through the threat of withholding all 
economic aid ensured the Netherlands' return to talks and 
subsequent Indonesian independence. American foreign policy 
did understand Asian nationalism. The United States-
Indonesian relationship was one of calculated risks and 
negative consequences in the American pursuit of an overall 
strategy of containment in the cold war period that happily 
did not degenerate into military conflict involving United 
States troops in a war to deny Indonesian independence. 
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The archipelago known as Indonesia comprises over 
17,000 islands, of which some four thousand are inhabited. 
In both area and population, the Republic of Indonesia is 
the largest country of Southeast Asia. With a population 
now over 200 million, only the People's Republic of China, 
India, and the United States are more populous. Indonesia 
has a land area of 736,000 square miles and extends over 
3,000 miles from northwestern Sumatra to southeastern West 
Irian. The archipelago is comprised of six main islands or 
island groups: Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi (Celebes), 
Kalimantan (Borneo), Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sunda Islands), 
and the Moluccas. Much of the land is mountainous, with a 
central range running the length of the archipelago. 
Although Indonesia is a tropical country entirely within 
eleven degrees of the equator, the heat is tempered by the 
mountain elevations and ocean winds. There are two 
recognizable seasons: wet (from November to March) and dry 
(from April to October). 
For centuries the island chain served as a bridge 
between the continents of Asia and Australia. As a 
crossroads for many of the world's sea and air routes 
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connecting Australia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the 
waters surrounding Indonesia funnel 80 percent of all Asian 
trade. The straits of Malacca, Makassar, and Karimata are 
of immense strategic importance. While the centers of these 
straits are listed as international waters and honored as 
such by the Indonesian government, traditional feelings are 
that these waters are part of Indonesia. 
·The people of Indonesia are racially and culturally 
mixed. There are over twenty major ethnic and linguistic 
groups and hundreds of dialects. The people are 
predominantly Malay in origin. Other important racial 
groups are the Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and Europeans. Of 
the minority groups, the Chinese are the largest and face 
the most discrimination. 
Ninety percent of the population is Muslim, but the 
influences of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, 
Confucianism, and animism modify Islamic practice. More 
than 8 percent are Christians, concentrated in northern 
Sumatra and northern Sulawesi. Most of the people of Bali 
have retained a form of the ancient Hindu religion, which is 
an amalgamation of Indian Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism 
from empires around 1000 A.D. Animists are still found in 
the remote interior. The Muslim population is concentrated 
on the islands of Java and Madura. Java is the home of over 
two-thirds of all Indonesians, and this concentration has 
led to uneven distribution of Indonesia's population, 
causing economic problems and retarded growth. 
Although economically underdeveloped, Indonesia 
possesses enormous resources. The islands are the world's 
largest supplier of natural rubber. Light crude oil 
provides the Indonesian government with much revenue, and 
the nation possesses 80 percent of all timberland in 
Southeast Asia. 
in the world. 
Indonesia is second in tin ore production 
It also has large reserves of coal and 
bauxite for aluminum. Combined with a growing tourist 
industry, a large rice industry, and the traditional 
plantation economy from colonial days, it is blessed with 
tremendous potential for growth. 
3 
Since independence from Dutch rule in 1949, the 
national language has been Bahasa Indonesia, a revised form 
of Malayan with elements adopted from various Indonesian 
local dialects, Sanskrit, Dutch, and Arabic. This unique 
language is spun from the fabric of a distinctive Indonesian 
culture that uses as its slogan ''Unity in Diversity" 
(Bhineka Tunggal Ika.) Indonesia attempted to remain 
neutral in the East-West struggle between the Soviet Union 
and the United States, and willingly accepted aid from both 
sides. 
This analysis of Indonesian internal and foreign policy 
in the period 1943-1949 makes it clear that the developing 
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cold war was decisive in shaping the United States 
government's relations with Indonesia. Strongly 
nationalistic and wary of Western colonialism, Indonesia at 
the time was a Dutch colony in turmoil closely monitored by 
the United States because of its size, potential strength 
and strategic location. The history of United States-
Indonesian relations during the period under investigation 
is that of one government and one nationalist, republican 
independence movement pursuing divergent, and at times 
seemingly incompatible policies. On the one hand, Indonesia 
treasured independence from Dutch control and aspired to be 
a sovereign, non-aligned state at a time of a bi-polar world 
controlled by superpowers. For its part, the United States 
saw Indonesia's strong growth potential and desired a strong 
partnership. 
American concerns about Indonesia's independence 
movement equaling de facto communist control, and its 
prioritization of Europe as the most important place to stop 
communist expansion, led to initial American support of 
Dutch re-colonization. This strategy fueled political 
instability in Indonesia. American support of the Dutch 
ensured rough relations between the countries during the 
1940s and the early years of the Indonesian republic. 
According to most observers, American foreign policy in 
the post-war era had a set of priorities that conflicted 
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with independence movements all over the world. Soviet 
encroachment was the problem and weakness and instability in 
former European colonial areas that were now newly 
independent promoted Soviet aggression. The United States 
attempted to fill these power vacuums and promote stability 
in new countries that would benefit its aims. 
World War II created this new interventionist consensus 
among American leaders. The buildup of large military forces 
to fight the war made United States policy makers global in 
outlook. Following the war, the United States was the 
dominant world power and felt compelled to use its power to 
foster friendly regimes in those countries. The American 
government often ended up enforcing, at least temporarily, 
the status quo ante by supporting colonial powers like 
Britain, France, and in Indonesia, the Netherlands. 
American policy in Asia was more problematical because 
of the attitude American policy makers brought to issues at 
that time. American foreign policy experts believed that 
the contest between it and the Soviet bloc was a zero-sum 
game. That is, a win for one side was a loss for the other. 
The State Department's definition of communist movements 
was so broad, that almost any successful insurgency was 
interpreted as a victory for the Soviets and a loss for the 
United States. In this climate, the desires of a 
strategically vital Indonesia to be independent and non-
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aligned was simply not going to be tolerated by the American 
national security apparatus. 
United States-Indonesian relations 1943-1949 
illustrated many of the negative consequences of American 
cold war strategy that would become more exaggerated in the 
coming years. The clash between American national security 
managers and Indonesian nationalist leaders served to extend 
the length of Indonesian turmoil. Time and again Indonesian 
moderates struggling to execute their strategy of diplomasi 
instead of armed resistance, only to have the United States 
pro-Dutch neutrality weaken their leadership among the 
Indonesian ruling coalition. By exhausting all of their 
political capital in their negotiations with the Dutch, 
republican moderates in Indonesia found it difficult to 
remain in control of the nationalist movement. Moderate 
policies became too closely associated with western 
influence, reminded Indonesians of Dutch colonialism, and 
thus became untenable political positions for even President 
Sukarno, leader of the Indonesian nationalist movement since 
the 1920s and the country's foremost orator, statesman and 
national leader. 
As Sukarno drifted leftward in his politics by 
including members of the communist PKI in his ruling 
coalition, and accepted increasing amounts of military aid 
from eastern bloc countries under the influence of the 
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Soviet Union, American foreign policy experts decided on a 
covert operation in 1958. By supporting the conservative 
military and political leaders in Indonesia, the Eisenhower 
administration sought to prevent possible Soviet and Chinese 
communist influence in Indonesian affairs. The operation 
failed and was discovered by the Indonesian government. 
Sukarno claimed that the United States government had 
violated Indonesian sovereignty and the incident soured 
United States-Indonesian relations until the Indonesian 
president's fall from power in a military coup in 1965. 1 
1 Information on Indonesian history and culture can be 
found in J. D. Legge, Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1964), 1-123; Robert van Niel, "The Course of 
Indonesian History," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New 
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1963), 279-
297; Ailsa Zainu'ddin, A Short History of Indonesia (New 
York: Praeger, 1970), 94-197; Leslie Palmier, Indonesia (New 
York: Walker, 1965), 39-94; George McTurnan Kahin, 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1952), 3-93; Bernhard Dahm, History of 
Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 
1971), 1-70. An interpretation of the United States' 
approach to Third World revolutions can be found in Richard 
Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (New York: The New 
American Library, 1972), 1-22. 
Chapter 1 
The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism 
Indonesia is the product of successive migrations from 
India and China. It is a melting pot culture that features 
animism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. 
Social organization shows vestiges of the aristocratic 
hierarchy of early Javanese kingdoms. Dutch colonial rule 
left its imprint on Indonesia. It improved communications 
among the islands and provided an economic foundation that 
began the interaction between the traditional Indonesian 
environment and the West. 1 
Organized Indonesian history began with two major 
kingdoms: the Javanese kingdom of Mataram and the commercial 
kingdom of Srivijaya on Sumatra and the outer islands. 
1Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Praeger, 1971), 1-70; George M. Kahin, 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1962); 1-78; Legge, Indonesia, 1-128; Ruth 
T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1963), 1-70; Leslie Palmier, 
Indonesia (New York: Walker, 1965), 39-94; Ailsa Zainu'ddin, 
A Short History of Indonesia (New York: Praeger, 1970), 94-
197. 
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Mataram existed around the eighth century and was followed 
by the Buddhist dynasty of Shailendra, which produced the 
great stupa of Borobodur. These early Hindu-Javanese 
kingdoms fused Indian and Buddhist faiths with their 
indigenous beliefs and began the formation of a unique 
Indonesian culture. Proof is found in the shadow plays 
based on Indian epic themes, the form of Javanese and 
Balinese dances, and Indian motifs on traditional batik 
designs and the stupa of Borobodur. It is not a tomb or 
temple, but a nine-layer stupa. It could be called a 
textbook of Buddhist beliefs through the use of relief 
sculptures. The reliefs communicate stories, and together 
with the layers, symbolize an individual's stages toward 
perfection. The pyramid shape resembles a kingdom with 
hierarchical order, and reveals Idonesia's Hindu and 
Buddhist roots. 
The Javanese states were based on wet rice cultivation 
and were aristocratic and military in character. Local 
village chiefs became government servants, and tribute 
collected by them was used to maintain irrigation canals. 
9 
The second kingdom of Srivijaya, on the island of 
southern Sumatra, was not at all like the Javanese kingdoms. 
Srivijaya was maritime in character, and its society was 
much more egalitarian. It was incorporated into the eastern 
and central Javanese kingdoms during the climax of Hindu-
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Javanese civilization, the Madjapahit dynasty. This dynasty 
went beyond agriculture to include commerce and gave rise to 
a new rivalry between agricultural and commercial interests 
within the Indonesian state. 
In the fifteenth century, Paranesvara, a refugee prince 
evicted from the lands of Madjapahit, converted to Islam and 
made his realm on the island of Sumatra the center of Moslem 
traders in East Asia. Commercialism and Islam became 
inseparable and fueled the rivalry between Java and the 
Outer Islands that was (and remains) an important factor in 
current Indonesian politics. Eventually Madjapahit was 
replaced by the central Javanese kingdom of the third 
Mataram, which fused Islam into the Indonesian cultural mix 
for the sake of political expediency. Hinduism became the 
way of the aristocracy, and much animism remained at the 
village level. The result was tension between the customary 
leaders, the Hinduisitc, aristocratic class or priyayi, and 
the local, fundamentalist Islamic religious leaders, the 
santri. 
As the Dutch began to consolidate their hold on Java 
and use the native, traditional aristocracy to control the 
population, the popularity of Islam spread as a form of 
resistance to colonialism. Islam would provide the impetus 
for wars against the Dutch in the 1820s and 1830s and 
provide the organization of the modern Indonesian 
nationalist movement: Sarekat Islam. 
Dutch colonization meant many things for Indonesia. 
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Until the Dutch arrival, Indonesia could except external 
influences on her own terms. The Dutch, with the advent of 
the industrial revolution, changed this condition. By 1870, 
direct Dutch investment in Indonesia had crystallized the 
dichotomy between the commercial centers and the 
agricultural villages, further exacerbating existing 
tensions within the traditional Indonesian order. 
Dutch control destroyed the Javanese trading class on 
the island and isolated it from the Indonesian economy by 
preventing direct contacts through international trade. 
Plantation economies were erected and controlled by the 
Dutch and forced deliveries of goods began. The 
aristocratic class, the priyayi, were supported by Dutch 
power. Power proceeded from an alien government, not local 
rulers. The scope of exportation of materials increased, 
yet Indonesia was drawn into the world economy with little 
change in village culture. 
Over the next sixty years, the need for industrial 
products shifted attention from Java to Sumatra.. The 
extension of Dutch political authority to the outer islands 
brought renewed conflicts. The Dutch won the Atjeh War of 
1878-1903, and exploitation of oil riches began. Dutch 
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consolidation of power over the outer islands henceforth 
served as a unifying force for Indonesians, who in rallying 
against the Dutch would overcome their own divisions. The 
power of anti-colonialism proved stronger than internal 
rivalry. 
Aware of growing Indonesian resistance to plantation 
agriculture and other forms of Dutch dominance, the 
government of the Netherlands etablished an "Ethical Policy" 
for Indonesia in the 1890s. The idea was to educate the 
Indonesian elite and provide health and human services to 
the indigenous population, thereby strengthening Dutch 
hegemony and eliminating discontent. 
Westernization was a new challenge to Indonesian 
culture. The process released dynamic forces within the 
ranks of Indonesians. The elite exposed to Western ideals 
quickly applied them to their own situation and found the 
Dutch wanting. Frustrated intellectuals could not find work 
or were forced into occupations they considered menial in 
relation to their talents. They began to organize against 
Dutch rule. Village life, which was disrupted by Dutch rule 
and economic development, was fertile ground for converts to 
the growing nationalist movement. 
The "Ethical Policy" of the Dutch had unintended 
effects. It eliminated any middle class, it left villages 
doomed to shared poverty, and it created an intellectual 
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class without the experience necessary to run large 
corporate or governmental enterprises or engage in large 
scale exporting of materials. Most importantly, it kindled a 
nationalist movement that would not stop until it gained 
Indonesian independence from the Dutch in 1949. 
Another effect of Dutch "Ethical Policy'' was the 
creation of a two-tiered elite. The first tier was the old 
priyayi, kept in power by the Dutch. The second tier was 
the new elite educated in Western institutions and employed 
in the expanded civil service of late Dutch colonial rule. 
Neither class was happy under Dutch control, nor was either 
one in agreement about how to change it. 
Centuries of Dutch coaptation made the highest priyayi 
on Java and their counterparts on other islands politically 
conservative. Lower ranking members of the priyayi and the 
santri, stuck in occupations far below their training and 
ability, were less content with the status quo. Dutch 
Liberals of the turn of the century could scarcely imagine 
an independent Indonesia, but dissatisfied Indonesian 
intellectuals began to work toward this end. In 1908 
students of the School for Training Native Doctors 
established Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor), the first modern 
political organization in Indonesia. Budi Utomo used the 
Malay language, the forerunner of the Indonesian national 
language, Bahasa Indonesia. Composed mostly of priyayi 
elite, they advocated the ideals of the West as compatible 
with Javanese tradition. 
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Islamic movements that advocated political gain also 
were gaining support. Sarekat Islam became the first 
association to garner wide membership among the common 
people. It was committed to promoting Islamic teaching and 
the economic prosperity of the community. The reformist 
trend in Islam was represented by Muhammadiyah (Followers of 
Muhammad) established in Yogyakarta in 1912. Mohammad 
Hatta, future vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia 
and nationalist leader of the outer islands, was a member of 
this powerful early group, only surpassed in numbers and 
importance as a faction by the Javanese, like Sukarno, in 
the Indonesian revolution of the 1940s. Sukarno, son of a 
Javanese teacher, would become the dominant Javanese leader, 
and Indonesia's first president. He would rule from the 
birth of the republic in 1949 until the military coup in 
1965. 
The initial objectives of Muhammadiyah, were modest. 
They wanted to protect Indonesian merchants from the Chinese 
(whom the Dutch had allowed to dominate trade) and protect 
the people from overzealous Christian missionaries so as to 
spread Islam. Sukarno would marry the daµghter of the 
movement's leader, Omar Sayed Tjokroaminoto. 
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By May 1914 socialism was gaining in popularity among 
the intellectuals. In that month the Indies Social 
Democratic Association, ISDA, was founded by Tan Malaka in 
Indonesia. As the most radical of the groups within the 
Sarekat fold, it demanded a revolution. In May 1920 the 
Communist Association of the Indies (Perserikatan Komunisi 
di Hindia) or PKI was established. The Indonesian Communist 
Party was led by Tan Malaka, a former member of Sarekat 
Islam. Backed by the Communist International (Comintern) in 
Moscow, the PKI used local leadership to instigate 
insurrections in the early 1920s on Western Java and 
Sumatra. These uprisings were crushed by the Dutch, and the 
PKI would not appear again until after Indonesian 
independence. 
The late 1920s also witnessed the rise of Sukarno, the 
country's first truly national figure. The son of a lower 
priyayi schoolteacher and a Balinese mother, Sukarno 
associated with members of Sarekat Islam in his youth, 
graduated from technical college in Bandung in July 1927, 
and established the PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party in May 
1928. The PNI adopted the red and white flag, Bahasa 
Indonesia, and the anthem Indonesia Raya as symbols of 
national unity. The party stressed mass organization, 
noncooperation with colonial authorities, and the ultimate 
goal of independence. 
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Sukarno had a talent for bringing together Javanese 
tradition, especially the lore of wayang theatre with its 
portrayals of the battle between good and evil, Islam, and 
his own version of Marxism/Socialism. He claimed that 
Indonesians suffered from poverty as the result of colonial 
exploitation and the islands' dependence on European and 
American markets. Sukarno wanted independence and 
envisioned a future Indonesian society freed from reliance 
on foreign capital. He envisioned an egalitarian community 
of people content to perpetuate the values of the 
traditional village, and the notion of gotong-royong (mutual 
self-help) . 
Minangkabau Sutan Sjahrir and Mohammad Hatta became 
Sukarno's most important political rivals. Graduates of 
Dutch universities, they were social democrats in outlook. 
Their political style was more rational than Sukarno's, whom 
they criticized for his romanticism and preoccupation with 
rousing the masses. In December 1931 they established the 
new PNI or Indonesian National Education Party. They wanted 
a gradualist education process to expand the Indonesian 
political consciousness. 2 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s the Dutch. hardened 
their attitude in the face of growing Indonesiin demands for 
independence. Sukarno was arrested in December 1929, found 
2 Ibid. 
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guilty of sedition, and imprisoned. In April 1931 the PKI 
was dissolved. The Indonesia Party, Partindo, established 
soon after, was also suppressed and dissolved in May 1934. 
The discriminatory policies of the Dutch had taken on 
many forms by the 1930s. Dutch social discrimination and 
arrogance infuriated Indonesians whose abilities, class and 
educational background were superior to those of their 
European rulers. 3 Judicial administration and penal 
legislation were heavily discriminatory. Islanders were 
restricted to inferior courts managed by executive officers, 
not judges. Indonesians could be held in preventative 
detention. 4 Netherlands bureaucrats held a monopoly on 
professional positions. Indonesian government employees 
received lower rates of pay, and received inferior 
educational facilities at higher tuition rates. It became 
increasingly clear to Indonesians that the Dutch were there 
to exploit them and nationalism blossomed. 5 
In response, the Dutch heightened their oppression of 
Indonesians. At the same time, Japan was increasing its 
aggression in Asia. Problems for the Dutch were twofold. 
3Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 53. 
5 In the rice famine of 1918, the sugar barons refused to 
switch acreage to rice cultivation, one cause of the 
subsequent year's malnutrition which, combined with 
influenza, killed 600,000. 
The Dutch needed more soldiers to protect the Dutch East 
Indies, yet Dutch leaders assumed that arming the 
nationalists would accelerate the loss of their Asian 
empire. Colonial administrators were more afraid of the 
Indonesian people than the armies of Japan. With the 
exception of Ambonese mercenaries, traditional soldiers of 
the Dutch crown, the Indonesian people were not entrusted 
with weapons to defend themselves. 6 
Anti-colonial feelings grew stronger in the decade 
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prior to World War II as the Indonesians realized that Asian 
countries could stand up to European colonial powers. In 
the words of Sultan Sjahrir, a future Indonesian prime 
minister, 
Essentially, the popularity of Japan 
increased as one aspect of the growing anti-Dutch 
animus and as a projection of a frustrated desire 
for freedom .... The idea grew that the liberation 
of Indonesia would begin with the expulsion of the 
Dutch by the Japanese. 7 
The Dutch Indies Government, a weakened rump regime 
after the fall of the Netherlands to the German armies in 
1940, did all it could to resist Japanese aggression. When 
the colonial government followed the United States in 
6Information Office of the Republic of Indonesia, Seven 
Years of Indonesian Independence (New York, 1952), 5. 
7Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile (New York: John Day Co., 
1949)' 18. 
19 
freezing Japanese assets and imposing an embargo on oil, 
Japan decided to go to war. A non-aggression pact with the 
Soviet Union freed Japan to attack the United States and the 
European Colonial powers in Asia on December 7-8, 1941. 
After seizing Signapore from the British and conquering the 
Malaysian peninsula, the Japanese occupied the Dutch East 
Indies. Japan's 1942 slogan, "The leader of Asia, the 
protector of Asia, the light of Asia" was appealing, given 
Indonesian resentment of Dutch rule. 
Initially Indonesian nationalists treated the Japanese 
as liberators, although, like their Dutch predecessors, the 
Japanese occupied the archipelago in order to secure its 
natural resources. The Japanese permitted the display of 
the Indonesian flag, the singing of the national anthem, and 
opened up mid-level jobs by interning all Dutch nationals. 
New mobility for Indonesian intellectuals brought support 
for the Japanese. Return of Dutch rule, after all, meant a 
return to repressive conditions. 8 
In fact, the Japanese exploited Indonesians every bit 
as much as the Dutch. Japanese aims were quite explicit: 
" ... the prompt development and utilization of military 
resources in the occupied areas and to look to strengthening 
8Sjahrir, Out of Exile, 237. 
and augmenting the Empire's war potential." 9 As Dr. Hatta 
declared in November 1945: 
For a full three and one-half years, the 
Japanese worked their will on the population, 
subjecting the people to a type of pressure and 
oppression unknown in the last decades of Dutch 
rule here. The Japanese looked upon the 
Indonesians as mere chattel .... Forced labor was 
imposed on the common people; the peasants were 
intimidated into handing over to the Japanese the 
products of their toil .... The entire population 
was obligated to conform to Japanese military 
d . . l' 10 lSClP ine .... 
As the war in the Pacific swung in favor of the United 
States, Japanese commanders promoted the Indonesian 
independence movement as a means of frustrating Allied 
reoccupation. 
20 
The beginning of relatively tolerant Japanese policies 
on the island of Java in 1943 confirmed the island's leading 
role in national life after 1945. Java was far more 
developed than the other islands politically and 
economically, and the Japanese encouraged the further 
development of Indonesian culture and self-government. 
9Japanese Military Affairs Bureau, Ministry of the Navy, 
"Statement by the Director upon the Inauguration of the 
Souther Area Administration Office: Draft," December 7, 
1941, in Harry Benda, James K. Irikura, and Koichi Kishi, 
Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected 
Documents (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia 
Studies, 1965), 13. 
10 Information Office of the Republic of Indonesia, Seven 
Years of Indonesian Independence, 6. 
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Bahasa Indonesia, not Dutch or Japanese, was spoken by 
Indonesians. Indonesian themes were employed in drama, 
films and art. Symbols of Dutch imperial control were 
replaced. The legacy of Japanese occupation evolved into 
the opportunity it gave Indonesians to participate in 
politics, administration and the military after 1943. 
Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese organized Indonesians 
into military units. In mid-1943, the Peta, or Defenders of 
the Fatherland, numbered 37,000 on Java and 20,000 on 
Sumatra. Japan's acquiescence of greater Indonesian 
autonomy convinced Sukarno and Hatta to cooperate. Sukarno 
and Hatta used all the means of modern communication the 
Japanese placed at their disposal to spread nationalist 
ideas and forced the Japanese to make concessions that would 
potentially lead to self-government and independence. 11 
As an Allied invasion of Japan appeared imminent, the 
Japanese announced in September 1944 that the entire 
Indonesian archipelago would become independent. The 
announcement vindicated the strategy of Sukarno and Hatta. 
In March 1945, the Investigating Committee for Preparatory 
Work for Indonesian Independence was organized (BPUPKI). 
The committee wanted the new nation's territory to include 
11 J. D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (New 
York: Praeger, 1972), 178-180. Sukarno also provided 
comfort women to Japanese troops during their occupation. 
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not only the Netherlands Indies but Portuguese Timor, 
British North Borneo, and the Malay Peninsula. The basis 
for postwar Indonesian foreign policy under Sukarno was thus 
established. The Jakarta Charter, an agreement based on 
belief in one God, was a compromise in which key Muslim 
leaders offered to give national independence precedence 
over their desire to create an Islamic state. The charter 
cemented the allegiance of the intellectuals to the 
revolution. The committee chose Sukarno, who favored a 
unitary state, and Hatta, who wanted a federal system, as 
president and vice-president. This was an association of 
two very different leaders that would continue until 1956. 
On June 1, 1945, Sukarno gave a speech outlining the 
Pancasila, the five guiding principles of the new Indonesian 
nation. 12 On August 15, 1945, the Japanese surrendered. 
Moving quickly, the Indonesian leadership formally declared 
independence only two days later: "We, the people of 
Indonesia, hereby declare Indonesia's independence. Matters 
concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be 
executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible 
time." 13 The proclamation was made a week before the agreed 
12The five principles are a belief in God, 
humanitarianism, national unity, democracy and social 
justice. 
13Benedict R. 0. G. Anderson, Java in a Time of 
Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1972), 82. See too Kingship 
upon date with the Japanese to forestall accusations of 
being a Japanese puppet regime. 14 
The Indonesian declaration of independence 
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notwithstanding, the Dutch, in desperate need of Indonesian 
natural resources to provide a sound basis for economic 
recovery in post-war Europe, were determined to reoccupy the 
country. The Dutch financial stake in Indonesia was huge. 
Investment alone totaled over $1.4 billion and the colony 
had turned over $100 million in profits in 1940. 15 
Holland's dependence on Indonesia was also psychological. 
One Dutch official stated, "It is the Indies which make 
Holland a world power. " 16 Accordingly the Dutch denounced 
Sukarno and Hatta as collaborators with the enemy and the 
new republic as a creation of Japanese fascism. 17 
Tradition in Javanese Politics for a better insight into 
Indonesian political history and the desire of the people to 
achieve compromise through consensus. 
14Mohammed Hatta, "Legend and Reality Surrounding the 
Proclamation of the 17th August," in Portrait of a Patriot: 
Selected Writings By Mohammed Hatta (The Hague: Mouton, 
1972)' 518-27. 
15Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The 
United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 
1945-1949 (London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 39. 
16Arthur S. Keller, "Netherlands India as a Paying 
Proposition," Far Eastern Survey, 1 (January 17, 1940): 11-
8 . 
17Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East 
Indies: Official Report of the Netherlands East Indies 
Government on Japanese Subversive Activities during the Last 
Decade (New York: Netherlands Information Bureau, 1944). 
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As the allies closed in on victory, the Dutch were 
eyeing the recapture of Indonesia. Sukarno, Hatta and 
Sjahrir envisioned a different future. Early Japanese 
success in World War II against the Dutch had shattered the 
myth of Dutch superiority. Nationalist ideas continued to 
spread. Paramilitary groups of Indonesian youth, the 
Pemuda, organized and were indoctrinated with anti-Western 
and anti-imperialists ideas. These groups would form the 
backbone of the Indonesian insurgency. 
The Japanese had created conditions for revolution in 
Indonesia which prevented a return to colonial status. A 
report written in 1945 by the United States Office of 
Strategic Services bluntly stated, ''the Japanese occupation 
of the Netherlands East Indies has made impossible the 
return of the Indies to the status quo ante-bellum." 18 
Violence was unavoidable if the Dutch were to try to 
reimpose rule over their former colony. 
The archipelago came under the immediate jurisdiction 
of Admiral Earl Louis Mountbatten, the supreme Allied 
commander for Southeast Asia. As Indonesia's distance from 
the main battle lines delayed the arrival of Allied troops 
18U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), "Effects of 
the Japanese Occupation," Research and Analysis Report no. 
3293, 1945, in U.S. Department of State Records, Record Group 
59, National Archives, Washington D.C. 
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on Java for months after the end of hostilities, Indonesian 
nationalist forces had time to organize. 
The governments of the United States and Britain had 
few preconceived notions regarding Indonesia's future. The 
immediate goals in bringing troops to the islands were to 
both disarm the Japanese and "maintain law and order until 
the time that the lawful government of the Netherlands East 
Indies was once again functioning. " 19 The second task 
became a priority despite OSS reports and both tasks fell to 
Admiral Mountbatten's British and Australian forces, which 
did not land in Indonesia until September 1945. 
Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull explained 
American policy in Indonesia in his memoirs: 
We summarized our thoughts on colonial areas 
in Southeast Asia generally in a State Department 
memorandum which I sent to the President on 
September 8, 1944. In this we suggested the value 
of early, dramatic, and concerted announcements by 
the nations concerned making definite commitments 
as to the future of the regions of Southeast 
Asia .... We added that it would be especially 
helpful if such concerted announcements could 
include (1) specific dates when independence or 
complete self-government will be accorded, (2) 
specific steps to be taken to develop native 
capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of 
economic autonomy and equality of economic 
treatment toward other nations. 20 
19U.S. Department of State, The Department of State 
Bulletin, September 23, 1945, 1021. 
20cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 Vols. (New 
York: The MacMillan and Co., 1948), Vol. 2, 160. 
Hull continued: 
We could not help believing that the 
indefinite continuance of the British, Dutch and 
French possessions in the Orient in a state of 
dependence provided a number of foci for future 
trouble and perhaps war. Permanent peace could 
not be assured unless these possessions were 
started on the road to independence, after the 
example of the Philippines. We believed that we 
were taking the long-range view, and that lasting 
peace in the Pacific was of greater ultimate 
benefit to Britain, France, and the Netherlands, 
as well as the whole world, than the possible 
immediate benefits of holding onto colonies. 21 
Earlier rhetoric from diplomatic officials and 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt seemed to confirm an anti-
26 
colonial position for the United States during World War II. 
Roosevelt himself in a radio address to the nation on 
February 23, 1942, declared that "The Atlantic Charter not 
only applies to the parts of the world that border on the 
Atlantic, but the whole world. " 22 These pronouncements and 
the promise of early independence for the Philippines 
profoundly influenced Indonesian nationalists leaders into 
assuming their independence movement would also obtain 
support from Washington. 
While American anti-colonial rhetoric was occasionally 
quite strong, enforcement ultimately was not. Immediate 
independence for Indonesia and other European colonies in 
21 Ibid. 
22New York Times, 24 February 1942, sec. lA, p. 4. 
Asia was a radical idea, while Roosevelt and Hull were 
really gradualists. Caught in the vise of inadequate 
preparation for independence and full colonial restoration 
of Dutch rule, American leaders sought other alternatives. 
Finding none, they retreated to a reactionary position 
regarding nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. 23 
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Even though there has always been a significant strain 
of anti-colonialism in American thought, it should not be 
overemphasized. At the root of America's conservatism at 
this time was the fact that it remained Eurocentric. The 
intransigence of European powers on the colonial issue and 
the need to maintain harmony within the Western alliance 
because of increasing Soviet aggression, coupled with 
Roosevelt's gradualist attitude and the military's 
insistence that national security interests demanded a 
string of bases in the Pacific that could not be compromised 
by recognizing Asian nationalism, ensured that the United 
States acquiesced in the initial attempts of the Netherlands 
to retake Indonesia. 24 
23U.S. Department of State, Minutes of the Advisory 
Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, August 8, 1942, in Box 
66, Notter files, Record Group 59, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
24Minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Three 
(Stimson, Stettinius, and Forrestal), January 2, 1945, in 
Stimson-Forrestal Meetings folder, Box 732, Edward R. 
Stettinius, Jr., Papers, University of Virginia Library, 
Charlottesville. 
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American anti-colonialism was never an overriding 
principle of U.S. foreign policy. The need to balance other 
interests always tempered these inclinations. 25 Far more 
important to U.S.-European relations was the order, 
stability, and development that European colonial powers 
brought to Southeast Asia. 26 Higher priorities remained in 
Europe. While the United States could broach the subject of 
relinquishing colonies with her European allies, she was 
still dependent upon them for the def eat of the Axis powers 
during the war, and to oppose Soviet-led expansion after it. 
Cordell Hull put the dilemma succinctly: 
We could not press them too far with the 
Southwest Pacific in view of the fact that we were 
seeking the closest possible cooperation with them 
in Europe. We could not alienate them in the 
Orient and expect to work with them in Europe." 27 
The picture became blurred for Indonesian nationalists 
because not even the State Department was unified in the 
25Roosevelt's personal affinity for the Dutch (he had 
Dutch ancestry and close relations with the royal family), 
predisposed him to think of them as liberal colonialists that 
would allow gradual independence. Abbot L. Moffat to Joseph 
Ballantine (Office of Far Eastern Affairs), January 17, 1945 
in folder labeled "Indochina, Political: French Postwar 
Policy," Box 9, Records of the Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs (PSAA), Lot 54D 190, Record Group 59, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
26McMahon, Colonialism and the Cold War, 4-45. 
27Hull, Memoirs, 2: 1559. 
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colonial question. 28 The Office of European affairs was all 
for giving the colonies back to America's European allies. 
Long the most dominant group of diplomats in the State 
Department, these diplomats, reinforced by the Navy and War 
departments led by James Forrestal and Henry Stimson, 
convinced the administration that European reacquisition of 
Asian colonies would go off with minimal difficulty. 
The Asianists within the State Department directly 
opposed the Europeanists. For a combination of reasons--
political, economic, and strategic-- these officials 
believed that European imperialism could not long withstand 
the force of Asian nationalism in the postwar world and that 
the United States had best align itself with the wave of the 
future. "We must not commit ourselves to underwriting these 
systems indefinitely," stated Far Eastern specialist Raymond 
Kennedy. 29 China expert John Patton Davies concurred that 
the United States could not be placed in opposition to the 
rise of nationalism in Asia. 30 
28McMahon chronicles this split in Colonialism and the 
Cold War, pp. 66-74. 
29U.S. Department of State, Memorandum by Raymond 
Kennedy, "American Interests in Southeast Asia,".March 26, 
1945, in folder labeled, "Southeast Asia, 1946-1948, U.S. 
Policy," Box 5, Records of the Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs Division, Record Group 59, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as PSAA Records). 
30u.s. Department of State, Office of Strategic Services, 
"Political Strategy for the Far East," Research and Analysis 
30 
The consequences of alienating the people of Asia, in 
the view of these Far Eastern specialists, would be 
disastrous: 
There can be expected from the native peoples 
increasing bitterness and antagonism. The United 
States, as the close associate and ally of the 
colonial powers, will share with the latter that 
enmity ... and the Soviet Union, whose policies and 
ideologies have gained a real hold over many 
progressive leaders in Asia and nearby areas, 
would stand to increase its power and influence in 
the area. 31 
American foreign policy did bring about one large 
influential result: withdrawal of American forces from this 
area of Southeast Asia. Washington felt that it already had 
a large enough area of responsibility in the Philippines, 
China, and Japan. Another possible reason for withdrawal 
was that American diplomats wanted to wash their hands of 
any direct involvement in restoring former colonial 
governments and thus preserve the moral high ground of their 
rhetoric. In 1944, Hull predicted that the result of such 
policies would be instability. American policy vacillation 
Report number 2666, October 28, 1944, Record Group 59, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
31U.S. Department of State, Memorandum by the. Department 
of State's Liberated Areas Division, "Imperialism versus an 
Enlightened Colonial Policy in the Area of the South East 
Asia Command," January 2, 1945, enclosed in M.B. Hall to 
Moffat, January 13, 1945, in folder labeled "Southeast 
Asia,1946-1948, U.S. Policy," Box 5, PSAA Records, Record 
Group 59, Washington, D.C. 
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made Indonesian nationalists leaders mistrust American 
leaders, mistrust that would take decades to erase and 
prolong the unstable situation. 
Closely watching events unfold, most Indonesians 
concluded that the Allied goal was the restoration of Dutch 
rule. The fact that British troops, with a long history as 
colonial occupiers, were sent to occupy Indonesia rather 
than Americans, added fuel to the fire of Indonesian anti-
colonialism, itself a product of centuries of Dutch 
colonialism and recent Japanese imperialism. United States 
government statements and traditions seemed to o{fer hope 
for nascent nationalist movements, but concrete American 
actions were not measuring up to the rhetoric. 32 
After months of internal debate, the State Department 
in late June 1945 worked out a broad policy toward 
colonialism in Asia. The result favored a Eurocentric 
approach. Cordell Hull, a strong Asian advocate, had been 
replaced as Secretary of State by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 
and the Europeanists were in command. Backed by H. Freeman 
Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, and 
Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, an anti-
32 For further information on the British role in the 
reoccupation of the Netherlands see Robert J. McMahon, 
"Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Reoccupation of the 
Netherlands East Indies,'' Diplomatic History, vol. 1, no. 1, 
(Winter, 1978): 1-23. 
communist career diplomat, Stettinius would announce a 
Europeanist position for American foreign policy. 33 
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Set forth in a position paper, the policy compromised 
some of the differences between the Far Eastern and European 
offices, but on the most important issues it leaned toward 
the European point of view. Its basic premise was that 
American interests in Europe and the Far East could best be 
promoted through cooperation with the colonial powers. The 
United States government should go no further than to 
encourage the colonial powers to help native peoples achieve 
a progressively larger measure of self-government and should 
carefully avoid any action that might undermine western 
influence in the colonial areas or impair the unity of the 
major United Nations. 34 
In the weeks before the Allied landings in Indonesia, 
the leaders of the young republic hastily attempted to 
consolidate their power. The Committee for Preparation for 
Independence transformed itself into the Central Indonesian 
National Committee (KNIP). This body was composed of 135 
prominent nationalists chosen by Sukarno and Hatta from 
among the leading religious, social and economic groups in 
33George c. Herring, "The Truman Administration and the 
Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina," Diplomatic 
History, vol. 1, no. 2, (Spring, 1977) : 97-103. 
34 Department of State, "Policy Paper on Conditions in 
Asia and the Pacific," June 22, 1945, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1945, VI, 558. 
the East Indies. It appointed eight governors to oversee 
the eight provinces of the newly established republic. 
Local populations overthrew local elites who had 
collaborated with the Japanese and the Dutch. Activist 
youths in the Pemuda played a central role. 35 Sukarno 
decreed that orders coming from defeated army forces be 
33 
ignored. The Japanese, anxious to avert a clash, chose not 
to challenge the Indonesian government. 
Indonesians would have more time to form a new regime 
than they initially thought. While the United States 
government avoided one problem by placing Indonesia 
temporarily under British armed occupation, American policy 
created a more serious issue. The British were woefully 
prepared. Their task was the liberation of 1.5 million 
square miles of Southeast Asia formerly under Japanese 
control. Since the reoccupation of British colonies 
naturally received top priority, it was not until September 
29 that the first British troops arrived. These troops 
found a functioning n~tive government actively supported by 
the great majority of politically conscious Indonesians and 
operating at a high degree of efficiency. 36 The British 
appeared to accord de facto recognition on the infant 
35Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 138-141; McMahon, 
Colonialism and Cold War, 84-6. 
36David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1948), 37-8. 
34 
government of Indonesia when Lieutenant General Sir Philip 
Christison, commander of the Allied Forces in the 
Netherlands East Indies, stated upon his arrival in 
September, "We have no interest in their politics ... What 
form of government the Dutch are going to give them I don't 
know. They'll certainly have to give them something." 37 
This attempt to deal with the reality of the Indonesian 
political situation was met with harsh criticism by the 
Netherlands. A spokesman for the Dutch position, Peter 
Gerbrandy, wrote in his postwar history of Indonesia, 
"British policy was the primary, if not the sole, cause of 
collapse of the once stable kingdom of the Netherlands. " 38 
Indonesia succeeded in the preliminary stage of 
revolution and independence. Its nationalists leaders had 
successfully formulated a working system with popular 
support. The second phase, consolidation and international 
recognition, would take longer. Intervention by outside 
powers would prolong the struggle for independence. 
Although the Dutch had been slow to respond following the 
cessation of hostilities, they had no intention of giving up 
their prize possession. 
37Admiral Earl Louis Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks: 
Section E of the Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 
the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia, 1943-1945 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1969), 282. 
38 Peter Gerbrandy, Indonesia (London: Hutchinson, 1950), 
105. 
Chapter 2 
Indonesia Attempts Independence 
Although the British, who had little stake in 
Indonesia, were willing to accept the realities there, the 
Dutch were not. They denounced Sukarno and Hatta as 
Japanese Quislings. The gradual, evolutionary approach to 
colonial management they espoused earlier was now out of the 
question. American officials were as disappointed in the 
Dutch as were the British. 1 A report by the State 
Department's Research and Intelligence Branch expressed, 
"unless some decisive and constructive steps to break the 
deadlock are taken in the near future, the situation may 
degenerate into more widespread violence .... " 2 Frederick 
Crockett, a United States military observer, made the 
following observation concerning the Dutch: 
... there began to appear in the streets of 
Djakarta roving patrols of trigger happy Dutch and 
1 For more information, see Robert J. McMahon, "Anglo-
American Diplomacy and the Reoccupation of the Netherlands 
East Indies," Diplomatic History, vol. 1, no. 1, (Winter, 
1978): 1-23. 
2u.s. Department of State, "The Political Issues and 
Occupational Problems in the N.E.I.," Report number 3279, 
October 19, 1945, Record Group 59, National Archives, 
Washington D.C. 
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Ambonese soldiers. They shot at anything that 
looked suspicious, and ... they were not above 
forcing an Indonesian house and dragging off, 
without char~es or warrants, some or all of the 
inhabitants. 
On October 28, 1945, major violence erupted in Surabaya, 
36 
East Java. Occupying British troops clashed with Pemuda and 
other armed groups. The Battle of Surabaya, a contest where 
over a division of British troops were held off by 
Indonesian forces for ten days, was the bloodiest single 
engagement in the war for independence and forced the Allies 
to deal with the Indonesian Republic. 
The British now found themselves in the very same 
predicament that the United States had sidestepped. They 
had to decide whether to withdraw or reimpose Dutch 
sovereignty by force. The Americans offered little actual 
help. Officials of the State Department tried to walk a 
fine line to maintain good relations with both sides. In a 
telegram to Truman, Sukarno asked for the United States to 
act as a mediator. 4 Washington listened to the Dutch, who 
insisted successfully that the conflict was an internal 
affair. American anti-imperialist attitudes were not strong 
3Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 142. 
4Sukarno message directly to Truman, October 26, 1945, 
856E.00/10-2645, Record Group 59, National Archives, 
Washington D.C. 
enough to cause the United States to intervene in the 
internal affairs of friendly powers. 5 
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Unofficially, the State Department was unhappy with the 
Dutch desire to resume control. Officials of the Research 
and Intelligence Branch concluded, "the situation may 
degenerate into more widespread violence ... necessitating 
armed action by British and Dutch troops against resisting 
Indonesians." 6 But the State Department was far from 
advocating intervention. "It would seem important to avoid 
any entanglement in the colonial problem? of western powers 
in Southeast Asia unless essential to protect American 
security interests from some threat not presently visible," 
wrote Abbot Moffat, chief of the State Department's Division 
of Southeast Asian Affairs. 7 
America's snub of Indonesian nationalists cost much 
goodwill. These Indonesians thought the United States was 
5U.S. Department of State, Interim Research and 
Intelligence Service, "Problems Facing the Allies," Record 
Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
6u. s. Department of State, Interim Research and 
Intelligence Service, Research Analysis Branch, "Problems 
Facing the Allies in the N.E.I.," October 16, 1945, XL 23086, 
Modern Military Branch, and "The Political Issues and 
Occupational Problems in the N.E.I.," Report number 3279, 
October 19, 1945, Record Group 59, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
7U.S. Department of State, Moffat to John Carter Vincent 
(director Office of Far Eastern Affairs), October 12, 1945, 
in folder labeled "N.E.I. Arms-Surplus Property Disposal," 
Box 11, PSA Records, Record Group 59, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
not living up to the anti-colonial position enunciated 
during the war. Indonesian disappointments were all the 
keener because the nationalists had adopted a diplomatic 
strategy that counted heavily upon United States 
intervention in the dispute. Ruslan Abdulgani, a leading 
Indonesian intellectual, stated the Indonesian position 
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quite well: "It may be that to Western politicians the Four 
Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter were weapons of 
psychological warfare, to us they were an immutable 
blueprint for the future." 8 
Though Washington pledged strict neutrality, 
Indonesians considered the American stance pro-Dutch. The 
American government trained Dutch troops and gave them lend-
lease equipment and economic aid in the tens of millions. 9 
Sukarno was quoted from a radiogram in the New York Times 
stating, " ... the Dutch continue to wear U.S. army uniforms 
and canteens marked U.S.A. 1110 
8R. Abdulgani, "The Future of Relations Between the 
United States and Southeast Asia,", United Asia, Bombay, 5, 
1959, 497. 
9For exact figures on American aid to the Netherlands, 
see U.S. State Department, the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee, Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, Special Ad 
Hoc Committee Country Report on Indonesia, July 22, 1947, in 
Box 109, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Records, 
National Archives, Washington D.C. 
10New York Times, 21 October 1945, sec. lA, p. 1. 
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The Nationalists, however, remained moderate in nature. 
Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir believed that diplomasi 
(diplomacy) was the best strategy because of the weaknesses 
of the new republican government. On November 5, 1945, a 
political manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia was 
published promising a welcome to foreign investment and 
protection for foreign properties. 11 Dr. A. K. Gani, the 
republic's minister for economic affairs, reassured all 
interested parties that his government wanted to attract 
foreign capital and would deal fairly with all investors. 12 
On November 9, through the efforts of Sukarno and 
Sjahrir, the new republic was given a parliamentary form of 
government. Sjahrir, who had refused to cooperate with the 
Japanese regime and campaigned hard against the continued 
existence of wartime regimes and organizations like Peta, 
was appointed the first prime minister. He symbolized 
moderation in that he was Western educated, and an adept 
negotiator. Moderates seemed firmly in control. While the 
11Charles Wolf, "The Political Manifesto of the Republic 
of Indonesia," in The Indonesian Story: The Bir.th, Growth, 
and Structure of the Indonesian Republic (New York: John 
Day, 1948), 172-5. 
12 John o. Sutter, Indonesianisasi: Politics in a 
Changing Economy, 1940-1950, 2 vols. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1959), 1: 310-2. 
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move pleased the United States, it was still unacceptable to 
the Dutch. 13 
Dutch intransigence, coupled with British and U.S. 
"neutrality," produced an unstable political situation. In 
the face of British and American diplomatic pressure, the 
Dutch offered to accept reforms that offered cosmetic 
changes. Their purpose was to buy time for the Dutch army, 
which was preparing to enforce Dutch rule by force. At just 
that time, the British prepared to withdraw. They kept 
contact with the moderates in control of the revolution, 
limited their present commitment so as to suffer no more 
casualties, and gave a foothold for the Dutch while allowing 
the Indonesian government to consolidate its foothold on 
Java and the outer islands. The British hoped for a 
negotiated settlement. 14 
American policy makers issued a proclamation on 
December 19, 1945, that revealed similar alarm over the 
turmoil in Indonesia: 
The United States.Government has viewed with 
increasing concern recent developments in the 
Netherlands East Indies. It had hoped the 
13U.S. Department of State, Memorandum from Moffat to 
Vincent, November 21, 1945, in folder labeled, "N.E.I.: 
September 1944-47, Indonesian Parties and Leaders," Box 11, 
Philippine and Southeast Asia Records, R~cord Group 59, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
14McMahon, "Anglo-American Diplomacy," 20-3. 
conversations between the Indonesians and the 
Netherlands authorities would have resulted in a 
peaceful settlement recognizing alike the natural 
aspirations of the Indonesian peoples and the 
legitimate rights and interests of the 
Netherlands .... a settlement can be attained only 
through a realistic broad minded and conservative 
approach on the part of all concerned and a will 
to reconcile differences by peaceful means. 15 
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This message encouraged the resumption of talks, and pulled 
the United States into the controversy. 
American involvement was a tightrope act that 
threatened to alienate both sides, but ultimately it served 
to undermine Indonesian moderate rule. American recognition 
of the rights of the Netherlands as the "territorial 
sovereign" amounted to the denial of the moderates' quest 
for status as equals. Dutch intransigence (made easier by 
United States economic aid) fueled Perdjuangan, an alternate 
strategy of Indonesian revolutionaries who based their hopes 
on the strength of the national revolutionary movement. Its 
chief advocate was the Communist leader Tan Malaka. He did 
not believe independence would be a gift bestowed by the 
Dutch. He felt armed struggle was inevitable. 16 
Dutch actions increased the appeal of Tan Malaka's 
revolutionary strategy. Early in 1946 Captain Westerling of 
the Dutch occupation forces systematically executed 
15U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State 
Bulletin, 13 (23 December 1945), 1021-22. 
16Anderson, Java, 308. 
guerrillas and civilians. Indonesians estimated 30,000 
killed and the Dutch confirmed 4,000 dead. 17 The killing 
fueled an internal debate over the course of strategy. The 
inability of moderates to gain quick independence from the 
Dutch encouraged more radical elements to gain power in 
order to try their luck. Competing political forces 
promoted turmoil. 
American historian, John R. W. Smail argued that two 
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separate revolutions were taking place simultaneously: one 
to establish home rule and one to establish who would rule 
at home. The difficulty of the moderate position of the 
diplomasi strategy "was that the Republic could not be 
maintained successfully against the Allies without the 
dynamism of the Perdjuangan, itself necessarily subversive 
of the domestic status quo. " 18 
Sutan Sjahrir, emphasizing the moderate attitude of the 
Indonesian leadership at the time and swallowing private 
doubts, sent an appreciative Christmas telegram to President 
Truman in December 1945 praising the efforts of the United 
States in the controversy. Moderates were still firmly in 
17Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 167. 
18John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 
1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian 
Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1964), 62. 
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control, but the reservoir of goodwill in U.S.-Indonesian 
relations was evaporating. 
The new year seemed to bring renewed efforts by the 
Dutch to reach an agreement. J. H. A. Logemann, the Dutch 
minister for overseas territories, declared the colonial 
relationship outdated. 19 By February, faced with imminent 
British withdrawal, the Dutch agreed to meet for formal 
talks with Indonesian representatives. Van Mook, former 
Lieutenant Governor of the Indonesian colony and now the 
Dutch representative at these talks, and Sjahrir, prime 
minister of Indonesia, led the respective delegations. Van 
Mook proposed a preparatory period after which the 
Indonesian people could freely decide their political 
destiny. He gave no specific end date to the preparatory 
period. Indonesia was to be something between a colony and 
a dominion. 20 
Sjahrir responded that he would accept nothing less 
than commonwealth status similar to Australia's in the 
British empire. Acceptance of the Dutch offer would lead to 
the fall of his parliamentary government. He knew that the 
19J. H. A. Logemann, "The Indonesian Problem,." Pacific 
Affairs, 20 (March 1947), 30-41. 
20 Idrus N. Djajadinifrat, The Beginnings of the 
Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe 
Talks(Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 
1958)' 52. 
rule of the moderates was tenuous and he had to press for 
full independence. 21 
The strength of Perdjuangan had grown steadily during 
the winter of 1946 as diplomasi did not produce results. 
Coalescing around Tan Malaka and demanding complete 
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independence as the minimal goal, the Persatuan Perdjuangan 
(Fighting Front, or PP) engendered support from almost all 
political parties and the major senior officers of the army. 
By forcing the resignation of Sjahrir, the PP appeared to 
end the rule of the moderates. Sukarno, as president, 
allowed Tan Malaka to form a new cabinet. Severe internal 
divisions prevented this and by mid-March 1946 Sjahrir 
returned as prime minister. The moderates survived the 
first attempt to end their rule. 22 
Sjahrir, temporarily strengthened, resumed negotiations 
with Van Mook. He demanded recognition of the Republic's 
sovereignty over the whole archipelago, rejected the 
transitional period, and asked for complete withdrawal of 
Dutch troops. He also asked for a body composed of both 
Dutch and Indonesians for the conduct of foreign affairs and 
defense of both countries. 23 Van Mook countered with a 
21 Foote to Byrnes, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 8 (14 February 1946): 810. 
22Anderson, Java, 310-6. 
23 Ibid, 316-22. 
proposal based on recent French-Vietnamese negotiations. 
Indonesia could be a partner in a federated republic. 24 
Sjahrir's response was conciliatory. Instead of 
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outright recognition of sovereignty, he now demanded only de 
facto recognition of the republic's authority over Java and 
Sumatra. 25 While the Dutch abided by Indonesian demands of 
control over Java, they refused to acknowledge Indonesian 
authority over Sumatra, and the new cabinet of Sjahrir's 
could not survive further compromise. Aggravating the 
situation was the Dutch insistence on a protocol instead of 
a treaty, the acceptance of which would relegate the 
republic to an inferior position as a possession. 26 
As talks stalled, opposition to Sjahrir and moderate 
rule increased. The problems all moderates face in leading 
a revolution became apparent. Control of the government was 
actually a source of weakness. The Indonesian moderates 
became personifications of the status quo which needed 
changing. Ruling in the name of freedom and independence, 
the moderates found it difficult to suppress the more 
extremist factions. Since they were busy governing, it was 
hard for them to retain control of the differing political 
24Hubertus J. van Mook, The Stakes of Democracy in 
Southeast Asia, (New York: Norton, 1950), 213. 
25 Idrus N. Djajadiningrat, The Beginnings of the 
Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations, 57-9. 
26 Ibid, 61-76. 
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factions. Extremist groups found they could continue their 
attempts to seize power even after their initial attempts 
failed. 27 
These factions, convinced in the spring 1946 of 
imminent Dutch military action, demanded Sjahrir's ouster 
and insisted the republic abandon diplomasi for armed 
struggle. The paradoxical position in which Sjahrir found 
himself mirrored the typical problems of moderates in a 
revolution. A major element of Sjahrir's political 
strength, his acceptability to the Dutch, prevented him from 
building a solid base of support within Indonesia that would 
calm Dutch suspicions. 28 
On June 27, 1946, extreme nationalists again challenged 
moderate rule. They kidnapped Sjahrir. Sukarno staved them 
off by declaring emergency powers and making a stirring 
speech on Indonesian radio. Appealing for stability and 
opposition based on democratic principles, Sukarno exclaimed 
that the kidnapping would give the Dutch the excuse that 
Indonesia could not rule herself. The appeal worked. 
Sjahrir was released and quickly consolidated his position, 
forming a third government by October 2. 29 
27Crane Britton, Anatomy of a Revolution, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1932), 137-45. 
28Anderson, Java, 370-7. 
29Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Praeger, 1971), 123-4. 
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The internal bickering of Indonesian factions gave the 
Dutch time to build up their military forces in Indonesia. 
By October 1946 there were 47,000 Dutch troops in the 
archipelago. 30 Dutch forces would kill some 40,000 pro-
republican Indonesians in the next year, and seize control 
of all the islands in the archipelago except Java and 
Sumatra. 31 
At this time, United States military support for the 
Dutch angered Indonesians. The Indonesian newspaper Merdeka 
urged Americans to protest the use of American marine 
uniforms by Dutch troops. Indonesians knew that the United 
States provided the military equipment used against them. 32 
The United States and Great Britain had the power to force 
the Netherlands to negotiate, yet were unwilling to use it. 
The new Dutch government realized that it was not yet ready 
to attempt to pacify the East Indies and following the Koets 
mission, an exploratory mission by the Dutch to test the 
validity of Indonesian claims of a working government in the 
30New York Times, November 24, 1946. 
31J. K. Ray, Transfer of Power in Indonesia: 1942-1949 
(Bombay: Institute of Political and Social Studies, 1967), 
111. 
32Garland Evans Hopkins, "Will We Fail in Indonesia?" 
Christian Century, (August 13, 1947), 972. 
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Javanese interior, 33 reopened negotiations on October 7. On 
October 14, a truce was signed stabilizing existing military 
positions. 
This truce, called the The Linggadjati Agreement, 
represented a series of compromises. The Hague agreed to 
recognize de facto authority of the Indonesian republic over 
both Java and Sumatra. The republicans assented to a 
federal form of government. Linggadjati created the United 
States of Indonesia as a sovereign and equal partner in a 
Netherlands union. 34 
Within days the British withdrew their final contingent 
of troops, and troubles began. The problem lay in the 
considerable ambiguity of the settlement. As stated by the 
Office of Far Eastern Research within the State Department, 
"The signing of the Linggadjati Agreement does no more than 
ease tensions ... In essence both sides ... cling to their 
original viewpoint." 35 The British were leaving, and the 
Indonesians would clamor for increasing United States 
33
"The general picture we saw was that of a society which 
was not in the course of dissolution but which is being 
consolidated." Quoted from, Wolf, Indonesian Story, 42. 
34W. H. Helsdinger, "The Netherlands-Indonesia Draft 
Agreement," Pacific Affairs, 20 (June 1947): 184~7. 
35u.s. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and 
Research, Division of Research for the Far East, "Recent 
Developments in the Netherlands-Indonesian Conflict," 
Situation Report-Southern Areas, number 3480.28, March 26, 
1947, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D.C. 
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involvement if the agreement broke down. Moderates were 
still in control in Indonesia, but their rule was tenuous. 
Dutch action would test this control. 
Throughout 1946, official American policy continued to 
take a neutral stance over the Indonesian-Dutch conflict so 
as not to alienate either side. The effect of this policy 
worked to the distinct advantage of the Dutch. By January 
1947, the United States had extended lend-lease and property 
credits in excess of 100 million to the Netherlands. 36 
Further, American officials refused to recognize the 
Republic of Indonesia as an equal party in the dispute. 
While Washington clearly did not want the Dutch to reassert 
control by force of arms, American "neutrality" did not 
foresee intervening to contest the Dutch attempt to once 
again impose their rule. Sukarno's anger was such that at a 
Malaya nationalist reception following Linggadjati, Dutch 
and American flags were not displayed. 37 
The deliberately ambiguous foreign policy of the United 
States government was not achieving its goals. Further, 
American maneuvering at the United Nations did nothing to 
endear American policy to Indonesians. American 
36u.s. Department of State, State-Army-Navy-Air Force 
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), Subcommittee on Far Eastern 
Affairs, Special Ad Hoc Committee Report on Indonesia, July 
22, 1947, Record Group 334, National Archives, Washington 
D.C. 
37Hopkins, Christian Century, 64 (30 July 1947), 972. 
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representatives refused to support not only the Indian and 
Ukranian proposals friendly to Indonesian independence, but 
even refused to back the moderate Australian proposal. This 
seemed to confirm that the United States was siding with the 
colonial powers and the USSR was not. 38 The Republic 
followed the Security Council deliberations closely. 
American positioning sought stability and a moderate 
nationalist regime. The problem was that it also sought to 
have the colonial powers maintain economic, military and 
political influence in their former possessions. 39 The two 
desires were mutually exclusive. While the Asianists within 
the State Department understood this aspect of American 
policy, the Europeanists did not. 40 Lack of agreement in 
the American camp caused deep Indonesian resentment and made 
it difficult for the moderates in Indonesia to maintain 
control. The ''Europe first" strategy of the United States 
would contain Soviet expansion on that continent, but 
exacerbated tensions in Southeast Asia. 
38The USSR assumed ·the U.S. worked through colonial 
powers when independent movements were too strong. 
39Testimony of Moffat, May 11, 1972, in U.S. Congress, 
Senate, Causes, Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War: 
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd 
Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973) . 
40 U.S. Department of State, Memorandum from Landon to 
Vincent, "General Political Situation in Southeast Asia,'' 
March 14, 1946, 890.00/3-1446, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C. 
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Deteriorating conditions in that part of the world led 
to increased American involvement on the Dutch side in the 
East Indies, particularly when British forces pulled out. 
American interventionist activity arose from the penchant of 
American statesmen to fill power vacuums, and by the 
Republic of Indonesia's strategic location and plentiful 
national resources. Reflecting this increased activity was 
a cable sent in the spring of 1947 from Secretary of State 
George Marshall to Herman Baruch, the new ambassador to The 
Hague, concerning Indonesian and other nationalist movements 
in Southeast Asia. Marshall expressed apprehension about 
the movements leaning toward totalitarian or Pan-Asiatic 
philosophies, "as either trend would be contrary to the 
interests of Western democracies. " 41 
Even though the United States was a new player in 
Indonesia, the American "neutral" position remained pro-
Dutch. Compounding matters, the very vagueness of 
Linggadjati led each side to take markedly different views 
of the agreement's meaning. The situation ensured increased 
United States involvement that would perpetuate instability. 
Two problems stood out. The first was the need for 
cooperation when neither side trusted the other. The second 
was the federal structure of the proposed United States of 
41Marshall to Baruch, May 16, 1947, in Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1947, 6: 924. 
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Indonesia. The republic, which represented 85 percent of 
the Indonesian population and the equivalent percentage of 
exports, had no more status than the other lesser states: 
Borneo and East Indonesia. This downplayed the republic's 
importance in the new government and ensured continued Dutch 
control. 
The agreement was doomed to failure. Attitudes on both 
sides hardened. Indonesian moderates realized they must to 
stand firm to remain in power in the republic. Van Mook and 
the Dutch government realized the need to control Indonesian 
raw materials, which were essential in maintaining a 
positive balance of payments and rebuilding the economy of 
the Netherlands devastated by World War II. 
Republican suspicions were aroused when they learned in 
the spring of 1947 that the Dutch were trying to instigate a 
rebellion on West Java. 42 The Dutch responded that 
Indonesia was practicing an independent foreign policy, a 
violation of the agreement. Some form of overt Indonesian 
resistance to Dutch rule became increasingly likely. 
Violence in Indonesia would threaten economic recovery 
in the Netherlands, and American policy makers began to 
42United States Department of State, Office of 
Intelligence and Research, Division of Research for the Far 
East, "Post-Linggadjati Developments in Indonesia," Situation 
Report-Southern Areas, no. 3480.29, April 9, 1947, Record 
Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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change their approach towards the Dutch. American support 
for Dutch rule became limited to a moderate or liberal kind 
of Dutch hold on the archipelago, one that ensured the Dutch 
of needed materials while acquiescing to growing national 
desires for autonomy. 
The United States pressured the Netherlands by 
threatening to hold up Export-Import bank loans and the 
Dutch came back to the negotiating table in May 1947. 
President Truman was keenly aware that Western European 
problems with nationalists movements in their colonies 
deprived them of key _natural resources. A report prepared 
by the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency emphasized 
this fact, 
Of important concern in relation to Western 
European recovery is the existing instability in 
colonial areas upon the resources of which several 
European powers have hitherto been accustomed to 
depend ... The continuance of unsettled conditions 
hinders economic recovery and causes diversion of 
European strength into efforts to maintain or 
reimpose control by force. 1143 
Indonesia's upheaval directly affected the rehabilitation 
and reintegration of Western Europe, and the expansion of 
production and trade there. It was also an important factor 
43Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World 
Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United 
States," CIA 1, September 26, 1947, in President's 
Secretary's Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman Library, 
Independence, Missouri, as cited in McMahon, Colonialism and 
Revolution, 143. 
in Western competition with the Soviet Union for the 
friendship and resources of the developing world. 44 
The Dutch and Indonesians came to an impasse after 
negotiations. While the new plan attempted to solve the 
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issue of sovereignty by calling for Dutch rule until January 
1, 1949, it severely restricted republican authority until 
that date. To make matters worse for the moderates, the 
plan came in the form of an ultimatum. Republican leaders 
were given only two weeks to accept the plan. 45 
The State Department believed that the May 27 proposal 
was made in earnest and encouraged the Republic to respond 
"promptly in a spirit of good faith and compromise. 1146 The 
Indonesian response was not so positive. The Dutch demands 
were denounced by most Indonesian political and military 
leaders. While Sjahrir knew the Dutch were preparing to use 
force, he also knew that acceptance of this proposal was 
44 Indonesia also supplied the United States with several 
important raw materials: rubber, tin, copra, quinine, palm 
oil, and tea. Political unrest terminated the trade. U.S. 
Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence 
Service, "The Economic "Situation in Java and Perspective 
Business Policies," Research and Analysis Report number 3288, 
November 2, 1945, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
45U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and 
Research, Division of Research for the Far East, ."Dutch-
Indonesian Notes of May and June 1947," Situation Report-
Southern Areas, number 3480.33, June 16, 1947, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C. 
46Acheson to Foote, June 5, 1947, in Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1947, 6: 941-2. 
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suicide for the moderates. While Sjahrir accepted the 
proposal in principle, he attached qualifications that the 
Dutch found unacceptable. Sjahrir brought forward proposals 
again on June 20, accepting the Dutch concept of the interim 
government. The Dutch again refused. When the degree of 
Sjahrir's concessions became known, most leaders withdrew 
support and he resigned on June 27. 47 
Washington continued to urge Indonesia to assent to the 
Dutch proposal. Abbot Moffat, head of the State 
Department's Southeast Asian Division, summarized American 
objectives in Indonesia on July 8, 1947. 
The objective of the United States is to 
secure a settlement of the present Indonesian 
situation which will meet the natural aspirations 
of Indonesian nationalism and, at the same time, 
preserve so far as possible for the Netherlands 
the economic strength which she derives from 
association with the Indies. 48 
This approach led republican leaders to conclude the United 
States was backing the Dutch against the Republic. 
47Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 207-8. 
48 Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981), 164-5. For more on U.S. 
thinking at the time consult Grayson Kirk, "American Security 
Policy in the Pacific," in J.C. Vincent et al., America's 
Future in the Pacific (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press), 166. "The U.S. thus faces a possible dilemma of 
supporting the maintenance, perhaps by repressive means, of a 
situation which is foreign to American tradition and 
political attitudes or of supporting or at least permitting a 
deterioration in the power position of those states whose 
collaboration is potentially of great importance." 
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While most Indonesians did not like the United States 
position and had ousted Sjahrir for making too many 
concessions, moderates were still in control. The new prime 
minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, made even more concessions and 
still the Dutch did not agree. The Dutch wanted a joint 
police force, and the republic felt it could compromise no 
further. War was inevitable, a war that Moffat warned would 
"probably strengthen Soviet influence in the area." 49 
490.S. Department of State, Memorandum by Moffat, July 8, 
1947, 856E.00/7-847, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
Chapter 3 
The Rocky Road to Independence 
On July 21, 1947, the Dutch, claiming violations of the 
Linggadjati Agreement, launched a "police action" against 
the Indonesian republic. Dutch troops drove the republicans 
out of Sumatra and confined them to central Java. Only its 
inability to destroy the main body of the guerrilla-trained 
Indonesian troops marred the Dutch army's action. 
Aware that international reaction to the Dutch military 
offensive was negative, President Sukarno appointed Sjahrir 
ambassador at large to take the Indonesian case to the 
United Nations Security Council. Simultaneously, Prime 
Minister Sjarifuddin broadcast from the republican capital 
of Jogjakarta asking for a halt to hostilities and help from 
the international community. 1 On July 25, Sukarno broadcast 
an urgent appeal for American intervention: "Just as your 
American ancestors fought 170 years ago for your liberty and 
independence, so are we Indonesians fighting for ours. Just 
1New York Times, July 23, 1947, sec. 1, p. 2. 
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as you then rebelled against dominion by a country far 
across the seas, so are we." 2 
Americans avoided any criticism of the Dutch attack. 
The American position, of course, further undermined 
moderate rule. When the issue was brought before the United 
Nations, the United States assisted the Dutch in presenting 
their viewpoint. The United States ambassador to the 
Netherlands, Herman Baruch, accepted uncritically the Dutch 
position, refusing to withhold the Marshall Plan economic 
assistance that most certainly could have been applied as 
the stick to force Dutch acceptance of the spirit of 
Liggadjati. 3 
At the United Nations, many representatives suggested 
that Great Britain and the United States should try to stop 
the conflict. The United States was concerned that the 
affair would cause the Security Council to divide along a 
Russia-Asiatic bloc against the Anglo-American alliance. 
America did not want to incur the wrath of the newly 
emerging areas of the world. 4 On August 6, the United 
States offered to mediate the dispute between the Dutch and 
2New York Times, July 25, 1947, sec. 1, p. 3. 
3McMahon, Colonialism and Revolution, 176. 
4U.S. Department of State, Memorandum from James K. 
Penfield (Office of Far Eastern Affairs) to Landon, August 
22, 1947, 856E.00/8-547, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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the Indonesians. While the republic accepted the offer, it 
also asked the United States that an international 
arbitration commission be dispatched to Indonesia at once. 
A significant shift was occurring in Indonesian 
republican attitudes. They now believed that the forum of 
the United Nations would better serve their interests. On 
August 14, over Dutch objections, Sjahrir, speaking before 
the Security Council, delivered a ringing indictment of 
Dutch actions. 5 The Council promptly called for another 
cease-fire on August 26, and established a Good Offices 
Committee (GOC) to sponsor further negotiations. It was 
composed of members from three nations: Belgium, an ally of 
the Netherlands; Australia, Indonesia's advocate in the 
Security Council's deliberations to date; and the United 
States. 6 Dr. Frank P. Graham of the United States was 
elected chairman of the committee. The Australian 
representative was Mr. Richard C. Kirby, judge of the 
Australian Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration. M. Paul van Zeeland, a well known economist 
and former premier, represented Belgium. 
As a superpower, it was clear that the United States 
would be responsible for shaping all proposals, .and it 
5Security Council Official Records, second year, 184th 
meeting, August 14, 1947, pp. 2002-3. 
6Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the 
United Nations (London: Steven and Sons Limited, 1960), 55. 
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subtly, but consistently, favored the Dutch position. The 
Good Offices Committee only advised, which accommodated the 
Dutch. They believed that time was on their side as the 
truncated Indonesian republic continued to deteriorate. 
Indonesia was well aware of the continued pro-Dutch position 
of the United States. Mr. Kasimo, Vice Minister of Economic 
Affairs stated on November 12, 1947, that "obvious 
partiality of the United States was being given in favor of 
the Dutch." 7 
While the United States worked to bring the two sides 
together, the Soviet Union's chief delegate to the United 
Nations, Mr. Gromyko, was making a speech to the Security 
Council in October 1947. 
The people of Indonesia are fighting for 
their freedom .... They find themselves confronted 
in this struggle by powers, who for centuries have 
been in authority in these areas. It is the task 
of the United Nations ... to defend the legitimate 
interests of such peoples .... 8 
The dispute was now taking on cold war dimensions. 
The American cruiser the U.S.S. Renville, anchored off 
the coast of Java, served as a neutral place to forge a new 
agreement. Members of the Indonesian nationalist movement 
and members of the Dutch delegation, along with the United 
7Ibid, 59. 
8United Nations Document 213, S/P.Vol. II, October 22, 
1947. 
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States representative to the GOC, Frank Graham, were aboard 
ship to work on a new accord. Initially both sides stuck to 
their own interpretations of the Linggadjati agreement until 
the GOC delivered its "Christmas Message" on December 25. 
The message was crafted for both sides and called for 
"greater realism" and "reciprocal toleration." It asked the 
Indonesian delegation to accept the Netherlands position on 
the military issues in return for a fair and peaceful 
determination of political issues that included the 
subsequent withdrawal of Dutch forces from all territory 
taken by the most recent offensive. 9 Frank Graham knew that 
the message favored the Dutch. The preponderance of Dutch 
military forces in Indonesia made a pro-Dutch proposal 
inevitable. 10 On December 30, the republicans reluctantly 
accepted the GOC proposal in a memorandum sent to the 
committee. "Although they are not strictly in accordance 
with the republican's own understanding of the Security 
Council's resolutions, the Indonesian delegation accepts 
9 McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 199. 
10The republic had to accept the Netherlands position on 
military issues in order to determine the political ones. 
The truce line was set at Dutch forward positions at the end 
of the police action, which Indonesian representatives 
disputed. The proposal called for the restoration of 
republican civil administration within three months of the 
signing of the agreement and Dutch withdrawal from areas 
taken during the police action. Each side would then begin 
troop reductions and free economic activity would be 
restored. 
62 
them as an integrated and balanced whole for the 
settlement." 11 Graham had advised the republican delegation 
that if they did not agree to the truce proposals and the 
twelve Dutch additions, the function of the Committee would 
end. The dispute would return to the Security Council where 
the French would veto any attempt at binding arbitration. 
Graham further advised that the United States would not 
protest further use of Dutch military force, but would hold 
the Dutch to the agreement. The republicans, although 
averse to many aspects of the proposal, agreed. 12 They were 
low on arms and ammunition and the agreement offered some 
movement toward independence. 
The Dutch sacrificed little. They attached a dozen new 
proposals to the GOC's proposal based on the Christmas 
telegram and accepted only those offered by Indonesia that 
favored them. The republic accepted all additional Dutch 
demands and the Netherlands still stalled. By January 1948 
American pressure on the Dutch began to mount. American 
diplomats urged the Netherlands to accept the GOC proposal 
11Republican memorandum to GOC, December 30, 1947, UN 
S/AC.10/76, GOC records, UN Library from McMahon, Colonialism 
and Cold War, 201. 
12Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 228. 
or risk the exclusion of the Netherlands from the European 
Recovery Program. 13 
American pressure on the Dutch to accept the proposal 
had roots in its cold war perspective. First, Dutch 
sovereignty would continue over Indonesia in the near 
future, ensuring that the Netherlands would fill this 
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potential vacuum while the Marshall Plan stabilized Europe. 
More important was the desire of the State Department to 
accelerate trade between Indonesia and the rest of the 
world. Indonesia could be a supplier of natural resources 
to the countries of Europe now depending on the United 
States European Recovery Program. Yet no matter how much 
the Dutch wanted to retain control of Indonesia, war 
prevented the end reason for control: European access to 
Indonesian natural resources. 
The Dutch bowed to American pressure and on January 17, 
1948, the Dutch and republicans signed the agreement on 
board the U.S.S. Renville. Many basic issues still remained 
to be resolved. American pressure had brought the Dutch to 
sign the agreement, ensuring Dutch cooperation to keep the 
moderate nationalists in power in Indonesia was another 
matter. 
13U.S. Department of State, Phillip Bonsal (charge, The 
Hague), to Marshall, January 12, 1948, 856E.00/1-1248, 
National Archives, Washington D.C. 
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The Renville Agreement represented a humiliating defeat 
for the Republic of Indonesia. Prime Minister Sjarifuddin 
agreed to the settlement in the face of strong opposition. 
Two major political parties withdrew from his cabinet and 
the government fell when he resigned on January 23, 1948. 14 
Once again, the pro-Dutch policies of the United States had 
a hand in shaking moderate rule, providing the opportunity 
for extremist forces to challenge the republicans. 
Yet moderates still had a grip on the power structure 
of the Republic. Mohammed Hatta, a firm moderate, announced 
the formation of a new government and quickly revealed that 
he was firmly committed to the implementation of the 
Renville Agreement. Once again the moderate strategy of 
diplomasi was able to resist the strategy ot the extremists, 
perdj uangan. 15 
The Renville agreement conformed perfectly to American 
objectives. Its compromise formula attempted to harmonize 
Dutch control over the Indies with a timetable for eventual 
native self-rule. The Agreement ensured the balance between 
14U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence 
Research, Division of Research for the Far East, "Analysis of 
the Political Principles of the Renville Agreement," 
Situation Report-Southern Areas no. 3480.48, February 11, 
1948, U.S. Department of State Records, National Archives, 
Washington D.C. 
15Anthony J. S. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, 
1945-50 (Hawthorn, Australia: Longman, 1974), 114. 
European and Indonesian nationalist interests. Like the 
Linggadjati Agreement previously, it rested on good faith 
and was also subject to differing interpretations. 16 
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In accordance with the truce agreement, Hatta began the 
immediate withdrawal of guerrilla troops from their 
strategic emplacements behind Dutch lines. 17 This was a 
major concession, showing the confidence and endurance of 
the moderates, but the Dutch would take advantage. 
The Netherlands delayed political discussions until 
March and in the meantime pursued their federal policy in 
open disregard of the Renville Agreement. Frank Graham, who 
asked President Truman to replace him following the 
agreement so he could resume his duties as president of the 
University of North Carolina, was succeeded on the GOC by 
Coert duBois, a recently retired Foreign Service veteran 
with extensive experience in East Asia as former consul 
general in the East Indies in the 1930s. The Belgian and 
Australian representatives also departed and were supplanted 
by their deputies-Raymond Herremans, a minister in the 
Belgian diplomatic service, and Thomas K. Critchley, an 
officer in the Australian Department of External Affairs and 
16U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and 
Research, "Draft Agreement: Comparison of Netherlands and 
Republican Views on Structure of U.S.I. with Renville 
Agreement," April 15, 1948, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C. 
17Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 234. 
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an accomplished economist. 18 While the diplomats on the GOC 
changed, the divisive issues remained the same, chief among 
them sovereignty and control of foreign policy. On these 
issues duBois sided with the Dutch, stating that sovereignty 
and foreign policy resided with the Netherlands. 19 
Stimulated by perceived American support, the Dutch 
proceeded with expansion of their federal program. The 
Dutch invited all thirteen non-republican Indonesian states 
to a conference on May 27, 1948. Republican leaders lodged 
protests with the GOC. 20 The Bandung Conference of 1948 
initiated by the Dutch, Graham complained, violated "the 
intent and spirit of the Renville Agreement."21 DuBois 
agreed and warned if the Netherlands continued to carry out 
its federal program without the participation of the 
republicans, the resultant government "will be an unnatural 
organization which only Dutch arms ... can maintain." 22 The 
18Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the 
United Nations, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 
102-3. 
19Dubois to Marshall, April 6 and April 10, 1948, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, ( 194 8) , 6: 135-36, 143-44. 
20GOC, "Report to the Security council on the Federal 
Conference Opened in Bandung on 27 May 1948," June 16, 1948, 
UN S/842, pp. 22-23. 
21Graham to Marshall, June 10, 1948, in Graham ·Papers, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
22 DuBois to Marshall, May 21, 1948, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, (1948), 6: 180-3. 
State Department's Office of Intelligence Research went 
further, warning that the resultant breakdown in 
negotiations would lead to hostilities and jeopardize both 
67 
moderate rule in Indonesia and the economic recovery of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. 23 
By May, duBois seemed to side with the nationalists, 
stating that U.S. political prestige would soar in Indonesia 
on the strength of a settlement that favored them. 24 He 
looked to have the United States become more involved and 
drafted a compromise proposal with the Australians. The 
resulting duBois-Critchley proposals sought to deal with the 
problem of sovereignty during the interim period before 
Indonesian independence. 25 The proposals kept moderates in 
power to deny growing communist influence within Indonesia. 
23U.S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for 
the Far East, "Implications for the U.S. of Threatened 
Breakdown in Indonesian Negotiations," Situation Report-
Southern Areas, no. 3480.54, June 2, 1948, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
24
"Indonesian Peace Brings Trade Rebirth," Business Week, 
(May 8 , 19 4 8 ) , 117-120 .· 
25Elections would be held throughout Indonesia for 
delegates to a constituent assembly which would serve as both 
a provisional legislature and a constitutional convention. 
Acting as a provisional parliament that would act as an 
interim government, the assembly would delineate the states 
to be included in the United States of Indonesia. It would 
attain control over all internal and external affairs. 
Sovereignty and ultimate authority would reside with the 
Netherlands. It would then draft a constitution recognizing 
legitimate Dutch interests. Once ratified, the Netherlands 
would then transfer sovereignty. McMahon, Colonialism and 
Cold War, 220. 
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The moderates continued authority also discouraged Soviet 
interest in the Republic. 
Republicans immediately accepted the proposals as a 
basis of further discussion. The Dutch reacted with disdain 
and broke off talks on June 16. The fear of the Dutch was 
that free elections would confirm what they already knew: 
the republic represented the vast aspirations of the 
Indonesian majority. By breaking off the talks the Dutch 
sought somehow to preserve their preponderance of power. 
Again American policy put moderates in Indonesia at 
risk and promoted instability by refusing to pressure the 
Dutch to any significant extent. The duBois-Critchley 
proposals were sacrificed to the perceived larger interests 
of American foreign policy. The issues of the summer of 
1948 called for solidarity among Washington's European 
allies. The success of the Marshall Plan and the 
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were 
paramount. Friction was to be avoided. Since colonial 
possessions seemed necessary for the rapid recovery of 
Western Europe, it was natural to keep the pro-Dutch 
"neutral" position. In fact, the American government was 
allocating $506 million in European Recovery Program aid to 
the Netherlands. 26 According to Senate Hearings held in 
26u. s. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research 
for the Far East, "Political Implications of E.C.A. Aid to 
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1965, American assistance to the Dutch in Indonesia from 
1945 to 1950 was $70 million dollars for Marshall Plan aid 
and $60 million in grants. The Dutch also received $75 
million dollars in surplus arms and another $100 million in 
arms made available if the Netherlands so desired. 
Secretary of State George Marshall admitted in 1947 that the 
United States had equipped a Dutch Marine Brigade fighting 
against the Indonesian Republic, and that the United States 
had provided the Dutch with 54 bombers, 64 fighters, 266 
mortars, 170 pieces of artillery-and 159 machine guns. 27 
American military weaponry greatly strengthened the 
Netherlands in its struggle against the Indonesians. The 
practical effect of European Cooperation Agreement, noted a 
State Department report, ''is to strengthen the economic, 
political, and military position of the Netherlands in 
Indonesia .... Reactions to ERP grants by the Dutch and by 
the Indonesians show that this effect is clearly understood 
by both sides." 28 
Indonesia,'' Situation Report-Southern Areas, no. 3480.56, 
October 29, 1948, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
27U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on 
Foreign Assistance, 1965, p. 574. Senator Brewster in 
Congressional Record, 81st congress, 1st session, Volume 95, 
part 3, p. 3386. The New York Times, January 5 and 15, 1946. 
28U.S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for 
the Far East, "The Role of Indonesia in the European Recovery 
Program," Report no. 3480.51, April 7, 1948, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C. 
While the Dutch took the American approach as a 
realization of their policy goals, the moderates in 
Indonesia lost much of their goodwill toward the United 
States. ERP grants were roundly denounced. John Coast, 
advisor to the Indonesian foreign ministry, made a public 
statement that the Indonesians were turning to the Soviet 
Union as a last hope in helping them achieve independence. 
Indonesians saw no difference between fighters for 
independence in Palestine or the Philippines, and 
themselves. 29 As native resentment of the United States 
increased, extremist enemies of the moderates were able to 
use American support of the Dutch as ammunition in their 
attempt to gain power. 
While the United States was maintaining a "Europe-
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f irst" policy, Asian specialists like William S. B. Lacy in 
the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs and Major General A. 
R. Bolling, acting director of intelligence for the army, 
complained that the American position would compromise its 
interests in the developing world. In a letter to the Chief 
of Staff Bolling warned, "The U.S. will be accused of 
turning its back on independence movements ... and the 
Indonesian republic and other sincere independence movements 
29New York Times, September 8, 1948, sec. 1, p. 14. 
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will be forced to turn to Russia in desperation. 1130 Some 
said the United States lost its reputation as a "champion of 
colonial liberation." 31 This tendency was sure to be 
exploited by Communist propaganda as part of American 
imperialism. 32 American foreign policy priorities in Asia 
now came under closer scrutiny and gained more sway within 
the American national security establishment. 
In the wake of the Czech coup orchestrated by the 
Soviet Union to cement a sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe, July 1948 brought a deepening realization by 
American diplomats of the need to spearhead further 
negotiations and bring the Dutch back to the bargaining 
table. As the two sides hardened their stance, H. Merle 
Cochran replaced an ill duBois, at the GOC. Another pro-
Dutch sympathizer for the Netherlands, the Indonesians felt 
that the American stance of pro-Dutch neutrality remain 
unchanged. 
30Bolling to Chief of Staff, June 15, 1948, P&O 091 
Netherlands, Planning and Operation Division Files, Modern 
Military Branch, National Archives, Washington D.C. 
31 John F. Cady, "The Historical Background of the United 
States Policy in Southeast Asia," in William Henderson, ed., 
Southeast Asia: Problems of the United States Policy, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), 18. 
32Lacy to Butterworth, November 25, 1947, in folder 
labeled, "Southeast Asia European Recovery Program," Box 4, 
Records of the Office of the Philippines and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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The state of the moderates became tenuous by July 1948. 
With republican leaders and Dutch officials arguing for 
control of the republic, other forces were at work further 
dividing authority and challenging moderate rule. In 
particular, the Indonesian communist party, buoyed by the 
moderates' bungling of the independence process, was gaining 
strength. The failure of the Dutch to comply with the 
Renville or Linggadjati Agreements had fueled 
disillusionment with the policies of the Hatta government, 
and the communists fed on this discontent. The prime 
minister's critics argued that the Republic had agreed to 
Dutch occupation of its richest areas and the withdrawal of 
Indonesia's best troops from strategic positions behind 
Dutch lines and had gained no perceptible advantage in 
return. The Dutch proceeded to create a federal government 
without the Indonesian republic's participation. The 
strategy of diplomasi seemed to only strengthen the Dutch. 33 
On February 26, 1948, the major opposition parties 
organized under the umbrella of the People's Democratic 
Front (Front Demokrasi Rakjat, or FDR) led by former prime 
minister Amir Sjarifuddin. Their program, similar to Tan 
Malaka in 1946, called for the repudiation of the Renville 
Agreement, the cessation of all talks with the Dutch until 
33Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 253-6; McMahon, 
Colonialism and Cold War, 237-8. 
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their withdrawal from Indonesia, and the nationalization of 
all Dutch and other foreign companies without compensation. 
With support from some sections of the army, the 
organization represented a serious challenge to moderate 
rule. 34 
The FDR's main argument was that the moderates had been 
sold out by the United States. Sjarifuddin, a signer of the 
Renville Agreement, felt betrayed by American policy makers 
since they had not ensured fair implementation of the 
agreement. 35 The return of the legendary Communist leader 
Musso to Indonesia in August provided the FDR with 
leadership. This man, who had led the communist uprising in 
1926 and formed the underground PKI in 1935, consolidated 
leftist forces to challenge moderate rule. 36 
In a bid to rob the FDR of its ammunition against the 
moderates, Cochran tried to bring both sides back to the 
bargaining table. It was too late. The stonewalling Dutch 
played on American fears of communism, making it a familiar 
refrain in communications with American officials. Their 
warnings were not without effect. Charles Reed, chief of 
the State Department's Division of Southeast Asia Affairs, 
counseled that: 
34 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 259-79. 
35 Ibid. 
36Ibid. 
if the communists came to power in Indonesia, 
the situation would be comparable to 
Indochina ... Our need for strategic materials from 
Southeast Asia may outweigh our desire for 
independence of the indigenous population of the 
area, if such independence is to be a pawn in the 
hands of militant, organized, communists. 37 
Dutch policy, in conjunction with the unwillingness of the 
United States to withhold military aid to the Netherlands, 
induced the next conflict within Indonesia. 38 
A revitalized PK!, led by Musso and Tan Malaka and 
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demanding a change in diplomatic strategy from diplomasi to 
perdjuangan, clashed with republican armed forces in 
September 1948 in Surakarta. The communists then retreated 
to Manduin in East Java. The Maduin Affair was crushed by 
loyal military forces and Musso was killed. Tan Malaka was 
captured and executed. 39 
Hatta used the opportunity presented him by the 
communist rebellion. By acting swiftly and firmly in 
suppressing the insurgents, the rebels impressed elements of 
the United States government. Americans now recognized 
37Reed to Benninghoff (Office of Far Eastern Affairs), 
August 27, 1948, 8560.00/8-2748, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
38Actually the communist party (PK!) had only 3,000 
members in the summer of 1948, a small minority of the 
nationalist movement, but growing. From Kahin, Nationalism 
and Revolution, 277. 
39Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 256-303. 
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republicans as anti-communists and accordingly began to 
pressure the Netherlands to accommodate itself to Indonesian 
independence demands. 40 Before the Maduin Affair, Under 
Secretary of State Robert Lovett said that the State 
Department had been alarmed by the grave and immediate 
Communist threat to Indonesia and" ... it appeared to us that 
Indonesian nationalism must be accommodated in a just and 
practical way as a condition precedent to dealing with 
Communism. " 41 After the affair, Lovett duly noted that the 
Indonesian Republic was the "only government in the Far East 
to have met and crushed an all out Communist offensive." 42 
To American policy makers, the successful defeat of the 
Communist uprising by Indonesian nationalists made the Dutch 
position increasingly untenable. Asianists within the State 
Department now pointed out that Indonesia was siding against 
communism and deserved American support. 
The fragile ruling Indonesian political coalition, even 
after its survival of the Manduin Affair, was falling apart 
from other internal stresses. Hatta, the closest thing to a 
conservative in the coalition, disagreed with Sukarno's idea 
40McMahon, Colonialism and Revolution, 243. 
41Memorandum by Lovett of a conversation with Stikker, 
Van Kleffens, and Blom, September 17, 1948, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1948, 6: 345-7. 
42Lovett to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers 
Abroad, December 31, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1948, 6: 618-20. 
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of a Pan-Indonesia that would include Malaya, New Guinea and 
the Philippines, and was against the most prominent 
expansionists. 43 Mohammad Yamin, an expansionist, argued 
that the Republic of Indonesia should cover the former Dutch 
colonies, Portuguese Timar, North Borneo, the Malay 
peninsula and all of New Guinea, as well as the Malaysian 
states given to Thailand by the Japanese in 1943. 44 Hatta 
disputed Yamin's claim that the Papuans on New Guinea were 
the same race as the Indonesians and he was in favor of the 
right of Papuans to independence as well as to an 
independent Malaya. 45 However much in dispute, in the wake 
of the Maduin Affair the strategy of diplomasi continued. 
43The Madjapahit Empire, the last of the Hindu-Javanese 
kingdoms lasting into the sixteenth century, considered 
itself to have supreme authority of a wide realm of islands 
and mainland territory of Southeast Asia. The empire, 
centered on Java, no doubt had a large psychological impact 
on Sukarno. In July 1945 Sukarno stated, "God in his wisdom 
has mapped out this earth. Everyone looking at the world map 
will understand what God has ordained as is shown on the map. 
God has determined that certain parts of the world should 
form single units-the British isles as one ... India surrounded 
by the ocean below and Himalayas above .... And when I look at 
the islands situated between Asia and Australia and between 
the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, I understand that they are 
meant to form a single entity.'' From Brian Crozier, South-
East Asia in Turmoil (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1965), 
113. 
44 Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in 
Southeast Asia, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall, 
Inc., 1966), 82. 
45Arnold C. Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front, (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1966), p. 123. 
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On September 17 the Republic accepted the Cochran Plan, 
a modification of the duBois-Critchley proposals. The plan 
was even more supportive of the Dutch position. An elected 
federal representative assembly would serve as an interim 
government and constitutional assembly, and the Netherlands 
representative retained veto power over the delegation. 
Republicans on the main Indonesian island of Java were only 
one of many states of a federal Indonesia and could not 
control the new government. 
The Dutch waited almost a full month to reply to the 
latest GOC proposal. On October 14 the Dutch agreed, but 
attached so many conditions as to make their acquiescence 
worthless. 46 Cochran now believed another crisis was 
inevitable. 47 Hatta foresaw another military 
confrontation. 48 
The Dutch began to negotiate directly with Hatta and 
the republican government, hoping to freeze out the GOC and 
obtain a better deal. Hatta offered major concessions to 
the Netherlands officials on the nature of the interim 
46Taylor, Indonesian Independence, 146-53. 
47Cochran to Marshall, November 1, 4, 6, 1948, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1948, 6: 448, 455, 467. 
48Hatta to Cochran, October 21, 1948 reprinted in Cochran 
to Marshall, October 23, 1948 in Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1948, 6: 431 and Cochran to Marshall, 
November 6, November 1, November 4, 1948, in ibid, pp. 467, 
448, 445. 
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government and the powers the Dutch representative would 
retain in the transition period, even sovereignty. 49 The 
response was a harder line by the Dutch. The negotiations 
stalled. On December 5, 1948, the Dutch delegation returned 
to the Netherlands. Once more, moderate conciliation only 
cost the republic power among its constituents. 
At this juncture the State Department now sent a blunt 
aide-memoire to the Dutch implicitly stating that their 
position threatened European Recovery Program aid. It 
contended that Dutch intransigence had lessened Hatta's 
willingness to reach a compromise solution which in turn 
fueled internal instability and the chance of another 
communist coup attempt. The letter reiterated the American 
belief that "the preponderant desire of the Indonesian 
people to govern themselves finds its chief expression in 
the Republic of Indonesia,· which must be considered not as a 
geographical concept but as a political force." Hatta, who 
acted "with skill and fortitude against the Communist 
revolt," had recently "given evidence of his desire to 
cooperate in a reasonable solution of the political 
differences" between the respective parties. Washington 
warned that a resort to military measures "could seriously 
deplete the resources of the Netherlands and tend to nullify 
the effect of appropriations made to the Netherlands under 
49Taylor, Indonesian Independence, 154-5. 
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the Economic Cooperation Administration. " 50 While the 
January 17 threat to suspend aid was verbal, this threat was 
written. On December 10, the Dutch replied with an equally 
blunt letter of their own to the State Department. Another 
outbreak of hostilities seemed certain. 
Moderates under Hatta sought to defuse the crisis by 
sending a letter to the Dutch delegation on December 13. 
Rejecting the latest even more conciliatory offer, the Dutch 
replied with an ultimatum. On December 19, they launched 
their second military offensive. By mid-afternoon on the 
nineteenth, the Dutch had captured the capital, Jogjakarta, 
along with Sukarno, Hatta, and half of the Indonesian 
cabinet. The World condemned the Dutch offensive. American 
aid through the Economic Recovery Program enabled it. 
With the Cochran proposal tabled by the second Dutch 
military action, the Security Council now assumed direct 
responsibility for the Indonesian-Dutch dispute from the 
GOC. American statements in the Council criticized the 
Dutch, but only in a restrained fashion. Acting American 
ambassador to the United Nations, Philip Jessup, presented a 
stronger U.S. position, condemning the Dutch action and 
supporting the struggle of the Indonesian people, 
50Aide-memoire from Department of State to Netherlands 
Embassy, December 7, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 6: 531-5. 
In light of recent events we now have a 
situation in which the Security Council must feel 
compelled to make recommendations. The time has 
passed for a piecemeal approach. The United 
States can find no adequate justification for the 
military action taken by the Netherlands in 
Indonesia. In many important respects, reasons 
put forward by the Netherlands are not supported 
by the Committee of Good Offices. The Government 
of the United States looks with admiration on the 
efforts of the Indonesian people, both in the 
Republic and elsewhere, to gain their independence 
and has steadfastly sought to support them. It 
still takes that position, and it is for this 
reason that it has taken the lead in endeavoring 
in the Security Council and in the Good Offices 
Committee to bring about a peaceful adjustment of 
the difficulties between the Indonesian Republic 
and the Netherlands and to establish the United 
States of Indonesia as one of the fully sovereign 
and independent states of the world. 51 
Walter Lippman, the dean of American journalists, 
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described the beginning of the shift in United States policy 
in his column of January 10, 1949: 
Our friends in Western Europe should try to 
understand why we cannot be maneuvered, why we 
dare not drift, into general opposition to 
independence movements in Asia. They should tell 
their propagandists to stop smearing these 
movements. They should try to realize how 
disastrous it would be to them, and to the cause 
of western civilization, if ever it could be said 
that the western union for the defense of freedom 
in Europe was in Asia a syndicate for the 
preservation of decadent empires. 52 
51United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 
402nd Meeting, January 21, 1949, p. 3. 
52Walter Lippman, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 10, 
1949. 
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The American position had come under attack, and for good 
reason. Dutch policy went against the United Nations 
charter, alienated the American people, and alienated Asia. 
The Soviet Union was using the American policy of support 
for the Dutch as a springboard into the area. Finally, 
American actions reinforced Indonesian views of colonialism 
and capitalism as one and the same. 
American policy shifted. The United States immediately 
suspended ECA aid to Indonesia pending the settlement of the 
dispute. 53 As far as the Indonesians were concerned, it was 
not nearly enough and amounted to no more than token 
pressure on the Dutch. Sumitro Djojohadikusomo, acting head 
of the republican delegation to the United Nations, charged 
that American financial assistance to the Netherlands was 
crucial. In effect, the United States government was 
financing the Dutch colonial war of suppression. 54 Sumitro 
would later echo the feeling of other Indonesian 
intellectuals by saying that in every case the United States 
53New York Times, December 23, 1948, p. 1. The 
suspension was largely symbolic because it effected only 14 
million in aid. In the meantime the Dutch had received 298 
million. From "U.S. Business and Indonesia,'' Business Week, 
January 8, 1949, p. 101. 
54 New York Times, December 22, 1948, sec. 1, p. 1. 
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would place the interests of Europeans above the interest of 
Asians. 55 
The American position towards Indonesia now engendered 
a public outcry in the United States. Dean Rusk, director 
of the Office of United Nations Affairs, still refused to 
support sanctions against the Dutch, who continued mopping 
up operations in the archipelago, to the dismay of many 
other Asian nations. On December 20 the government of India 
reflected the views of all Asia in a bluntly worded aide-
memoire to the State Department. The message complained 
that Dutch Economic Recovery Program aid was being used to 
oppose national freedom in Southeast Asia. "Intense popular 
feelings roused against the Netherlands Government in 
Indonesia ... have a tendency to become hostile to ... Marshall 
Plan Aid. " 56 
The American-supported Security Council resolutions of 
December 24 and 28 were revealed as half-measures. Events 
would rapidly render the weak American response to the 
crisis untenable. Acting secretary Robert Lovett at the 
State Department urged stronger American action to help the 
55Memorandum by Charlton Ogburn of a conversation with 
Sumitro, May 19, 1949, 501 BC Indonesia/5-1949, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C. 
56Aide-memoire from Government of India to Department of 
State, December 20, 1948, 856D.00/12-1748, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
moderate government of Sukarno and Hatta. The State 
Department summarized: 
In the course of the past few months, the 
Department had come to believe that the Sukarno-
Hatta Government might well constitute the last 
bridge between the West and the Indonesian 
nationalists. Rather than scrap this bridge in 
the probably futile hope that 9 million Dutch 
would be able to control 75 million Indonesians 
against the will of effective elements, wisdom had 
appeared to require that on the basis of a 
calculation of the obvious risks, the United 
States should endeavor to persuade the Netherlands 
to offer such concessions to the nationalist 
movement as would have made possible an 
agreement. 57 
The most effective leverage was, and had always been, 
suspension of Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands. 
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Suspension of aid risked a general break with the Dutch, but 
Dean Rusk was unwilling to suspend aid. 58 Army Intelligence 
stated that the sanctions against the Dutch would undermine 
the military interests of the United States. 59 Thus, 
American policy would continue to be one of pro-Dutch 
neutrality even thoug0 it encouraged the spread of communism 
57Lovett to certain Diplomatic and Consular Off ices 
Abroad, January 5, 1949, 890.00/1-549, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
58Rusk to Jessup, December 23, 1948, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1948, 6: 597-600. 
59Maddocks to Wedemeyer, December 23, 1948, Planning & 
Operations 091 Netherlands, Planning and Operations Division 
Files, Modern Military Branch, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C. 
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in Southeast Asia, dealt a blow to modern moderate Asian 
nationalism, and risked the European Recovery Program. 
In January 1949 the Security Council demanded the 
reinstatement of the republican government. In the 
resolution of January 28, it asked the Netherlands to cease 
all hostilities, release republican political prisoners, 
resume negotiations with the Republic on the basis of 
Linggadjati and Renville, and form an interim government to 
be established by March 15, 1949. Finally, the United 
States and the United Nations pressured the Dutch to accept 
a full transfer of authority to Indonesians by July 1, 
1950. 60 
American pressure increased as American policy makers 
realized that European and Asian interests were not mutually 
exclusive and that Dutch action was prolonging the 
revolutionary struggle to the advantage of leftist 
elements. 61 Jessup condemned the second Dutch action on 
January 11. Further encouraging U.S. pressure on the Dutch 
was the introduction in the Senate of a resolution by Owen 
60 Phillip Jessup, The Birth of Nations, (New. York: 
Columbia University Press, 1974), 88-9. 
61Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World 
Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United 
States," CIA 1-49, January 19, 1949, President's Secretary's 
File, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, 
Missouri. 
Brewster which called for the suspension of all Marshall 
Plan aid to the Netherlands.~ 
Offered as an amendment to the bill extending the 
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Marshall Plan, Brewster's resolution now imperiled U.S. cold 
war containment policy worldwide. The resolution read, 
Whereas the Royal Netherlands Government, on 
December 19, 1948, in violation of her sworn 
commitments under the Renville Agreement, signed 
by the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia 
aboard the U.S.S. Renville, January 17, 1948, 
under the auspices of the United Nations Good 
Offices Committee, did willfully and without 
warning launch a military attack against the 
Republic of Indonesia; and 
Whereas the United Nations, on December 24, 1948 
did order the Royal Netherlands Government to 
cease hostilities forthwith; and 
Whereas the Royal Netherlands Government did 
ignore these orders of the united Nations Security 
Council; Therefore be it 
Resolved, that in full support of the foreign 
policy of the United States and in support of the 
United Nations, the President is hereby urged to 
cause an immediate cessation of all financial aid, 
through the E.C.A. or any other United States 
Government Agency directly or indirectly to the 
Royal Netherlands Government, in Europe as well as 
in Indonesia, until the Royal Netherlands 
62Congressional Record, February 7, 1949, U.S. Congress, 
Senate, 8lst Congress, 1st session, 95: 831. Brewster 
remembered the Dutch actions on the eve of the Second World 
War. Dutch oil and rubber owners rejected the call of 
Americans for strategic materials except upon truly 
exorbitant terms, even after their surrender to the Germans. 
Brewster became convinced that Dutch rights to Indonesia must 
not be renewed. In Congressional Record, March 20, 1949, p. 
3383-4. 
Government ceases hostilities against the 
Indonesian Republic, withdraws her armed force to 
her side of the demilitarized zones established 
under the Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948, 
and opens bona fide negotiations with the 
Indonesian Republic under the terms of the 
Renville Agreement. 63 
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While this resolution was being offered in the United States 
Senate, Cochran continued to pressure Dutch officials in 
Indonesia. Dutch actions in Indonesia had set off 
resentment in all of Asia and encouraged the growth of 
communism. 64 
The Dutch saw the handwriting on the wall. Not only 
had American pressure increased, but mounting Indonesian 
guerrilla activity had placed Dutch troops on the defensive 
by the end of January 1949. 65 On February 26 they offered a 
compromise, accelerating the timetable for the transfer of 
sovereignty. 
63Congressional Record, 8lst Congress, 1st session, Vol. 
95, Part I, p. 83. 
64Cochran to Lovett, February 9, 1949, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, ·1949, 7: 1, 216-9. 
65Newsweek, March 21, 1949, pp. 44-45. Realizing the 
high probability of a second Dutch military offensive, the 
Indonesian high command had reorganized the Indonesian army 
just after the Linggadjati Agreement. The army.of 470,000 
was divided into two groups: a well armed conventional army 
and the lesser armed guerrillas to strike and run. The goal 
was to force a stalemate in the field. Even though the Dutch 
controlled all the major cities on Sumatra and Java, the 
150,000 Dutch troops could not control the countryside. See 
Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 3-5. 
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Initially, the Indonesians refused the Dutch offer. 
Transfer of sovereignty was to be on Dutch terms. The 
republican government would not be restored before the 
conference at The Hague. Indonesian reluctance to negotiate 
was buoyed by the unexpected decision of the heads of the 
federal states (established by the Dutch) to support the 
moderate republicans. Even the Federalists appointed by the 
Dutch considered Sukarno and Hatta to be the true 
nationalist leaders. 
While the United States government pressured ihe Dutch 
to settle the dispute, it had still not halted Marshall Plan 
aid. New Dutch developments, along with increasing 
criticism of Truman's Indonesian policy, created an 
atmosphere of indecision in Washington. Debate continued. 
A principal point was that Marshall Plan aid to the 
Netherlands equaled Dutch spending to sustain its military 
effort against the Indonesian republic. 66 Former vice-
president Henry A. Wallace charged, "Marshall Plan aid had 
been used to maintain_ Europe's colonial system by force of 
arms." 67 In March, Senator George Aiken of Vermont asked, 
"What good would the Atlantic Pact be in promoting the 
safety and security of the United States if by.winking at 
66New York Times, January 12, 1949, sec. 1, p. 6. 
67Statement by Henry A. Wallace, February 23, 1949, U.S. 
Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Extension of the 
European Recovery Program: Hearings, 583. 
88 
the Dutch actions in Indonesia we force one billion 
Orientals to look elsewhere for friendship and world 
trade?" 68 
By spring, the shift in American foreign policy 
crystallized with the National Security Council release of 
NSC-51 on March 29, 1949. It flatly declared that, 
"nineteenth century imperialism is no antidote to communism 
in revolutionary colonial areas .... The satisfaction of 
militant nationalism is the first essential requirement for 
resistance to Stalinism." NSC-51 called for "the creation 
of a sovereign Indonesian state which will satisfy the 
fundamental demands of militant nationalism in the 
archipelago." The document declared that, "the earliest 
feasible transfer of authority from the Dutch to the 
Indonesians is imperative, and will require additional 
pressure on the Dutch. 1169 
American businessmen agreed with the Council's 
assessment. H. L. Riddle of Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
68Statement by Senator George Aiken, March 29, 1949, U.S. 
Congress, Senate, 8lst congress, 1st session, Congressional 
Record, 95: 3387. 
6911 U. S. Policy toward Southeast Asia, a Report to the 
National Security Council by the Secretary of State," March 
29, 1949 (NSC-51), P&O 092 Asia, Planning and Operations 
Division Files, Modern Military Branch, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
Company thought Indonesia the key to the whole Far East. 70 
Standard Vacuum Oil Company sounded similar warnings: "Of 
all the countries of the Far East, Indonesia is one of the 
most important, if not the most important, from the 
standpoint of strategic location and natural resources." 71 
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The moderates of the Indonesian republic had weathered 
the storm. Even NSC-51 labeled the Republic of Indonesia 
government officials Sukarno and Hatta "essentially men of 
moderation." Their staunch anti-communism, proven in the 
wake of the Manduin Uprising, undoubtedly helped their 
cause. 72 The United States government was now ready to halt 
all assistance to the Dutch. 
Settlement of American-Dutch differences came quickly. 
As State Department official Dean Acheson said about the 
Dutch, "money talked. " 73 The United States could not let 
70U.S. Department of State, Memorandum by Ogburn of a 
conversation with H. L. Riddle (Assistant Comptroller, 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company), April 4, 1949, 856D.00/4-
449, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
71U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Standard Vacuum 
Oil Company to Department of State in Respect to Indonesia, 
enclosed in Philo W. Parker (Chairman of Board, Stanvac) to 
Jessup, September 31, 1949, 856D.00/9-1346, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C. 
72U.S. Policy toward Southeast Asia, a Report to the 
National Security Council by the Secretary of State," March 
29, 1949 (NSC-51), P&O 092 Asia, Planning and Operations 
Division Files, Modern Military Branch, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
73Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) 111-2. 
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the Dutch directly threaten the survival of the centerpiece 
of American foreign policy, the European Recovery Program, 
through Senate passage of the Brewster amendment. 
On April 14 negotiations reopened between republicans 
and the Dutch, directed by the United Nations Commission on 
Indonesia. Mohammed Rum, head of the republican delegation, 
immediately insisted upon the restoration of the Indonesian 
republic prior to the cease-fire. The Dutch refused. 
Cochran urged the republicans to offer key concessions. As 
a condition for the restoration of the republican government 
in Jogjakarta, Sukarno and Hatta agreed to maintenance of 
law and order and to participate in yet another conference 
at The Hague. The proposal did not call for Dutch 
withdrawal from any of the areas overrun in the second 
police action. Further, republicans would make up only one 
third of the delegates of the United States of Indonesia and 
total only one of fifteen Indonesian states. This Dutch 
federal structure, designed to freeze out republicans and 
divide the nationalist movement, was still in place. 
Sukarno, Hatta, and the majority of the republican leaders 
reluctantly accepted the Cochran compromise proposal known 
as the Rum-van Royen agreement. 74 
While Indonesians were a step closer to independence, 
moderate nationalists' acceptance of the Rum-van Royen 
74McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 29. 
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agreement used up what little political capital they had 
left. Mohammed Natsir, a major nationalist leader who 
emerged later as prime minister, resigned from the 
delegation. The Indonesian army was unhappy as well. Army 
officers felt the armed forces had brought the Dutch to the 
table only to see the politicians surrender their hard-won 
gains. The educated elite of the country viewed the 
agreement as a result of Dutch bullying engineered by the 
United States. They felt moderate leaders had 
capitulated. 75 
But the moderates saw the agreement as a pragmatic 
compromise on the way to independence. Their realism made 
them susceptible to attack from more radical elements, as is 
often the case. Realistic, but unpopular, decisions bred 
dissension. 
Even in the face of all of these difficulties, the 
moderate nationalists' strategy of diplomasi, diplomacy over 
armed aggression, triumphed. On July 6, 1949, Sukarno and 
Hatta returned to Jogjarkata. On July 7, General Surdiman, 
the leader of the Republic's armed forces and opponent of 
the Rum-van Royen proposals, submitted his forces to the 
civilian leadership of the Republic. Leaders .of the other 
federated states agreed that the republican government 
should receive the transfer of sovereignty from the 
75Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 421-6. 
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Netherlands. 76 The Dutch agreed to withdraw all troops. 
Elections were to be held for a Constituent Assembly, and 
The Roundtable Conference began August 23, 1949 at The 
Hague. 77 
The conference focused on three major issues: the 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union, the debt question, and control 
of West Irian (West New Guinea). Moderates would have to 
compromise still more, and the United States, through 
Cochran, was instrumental in forging an agreement. 
The question of union first arose when T. B. 
Simatupang, head of the republican delegation, stated that 
the question of union was moot and that only a loose union 
should be recognized. The Dutch naturally wanted a closely 
bound union under the queen. 78 Regardless of the wording, 
the Republic would be independent and pursue its own foreign 
policy. 
The debt question was more difficult to solve, for each 
side claimed the other owed money. The Dutch said that the 
republicans owed them approximately 6.1 billion guilders 
76By not giving the other fourteen states any real 
responsibilities of government, the Dutch strategy of 
splitting the nationalist movement along the lines of 
Javanese vs. Outer Islands failed. In fact the second Dutch 
police action had ensured this. Kahin, Nationalism and 
Revolution, chapter XII. 
77McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 297. 
78Taylor, Indonesian Independence, 222-39. 
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($1.73 billion). The republicans countered that the Dutch 
owed the Indonesians 540,000 guilders. Cochran's view, that 
Indonesian republicans owed 4.3 billion guilders, was 
reluctantly accepted by both sides. 79 Once again the 
moderates were forced to yield. 
By October the only major stumbling block that remained 
was West Irian. The issue was highly emotional. To 
Indonesians, Dutch transfer of sovereignty meant transfer of 
all sovereignty, and West Irian had been claimed as part of 
the Indonesian archipelago as far back as the Madjahapit 
dynasty. The Dutch, wanting to retain an island so that 
they could remain a Pacific power, argued that West Irian 
was not a part of Indonesia. Once again the moderates 
compromised, leaving West Irian to the Dutch with free 
elections to be held in one year. 
The conference closed on November 2, 1949. Indonesia 
became a sovereign, independent state on December 27, 1949. 
The strategy of diplomasi had finally secured independence, 
but at the price of a fluid political environment. 
Prolonged Dutch, British and now American intervention had 
led to instability. Coup attempts occurred as different 
forces dueled for control within the country .. Neither the 
left, nor the right, was happy with the moderate stance. 
Moderates would be forced to choose sides, increasing 
79Ibid. 
instability and the nation's chances for experiencing 
outside intervention. 
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Ultimately, American interpretation of Indonesian 
politics also contributed to the likelihood of foreign 
intervention in Indonesian affairs and prolongation of the 
Indonesian cycle of uprisings. American commitment to 
Indonesian self-determination was limited. Washington 
wanted gradual evolutionary change that it could monitor and 
control, not revolutionary change. Initially it needed the 
support of the Dutch in Europe, and (while publicly neutral) 
was really pro-Dutch in outlook. It essentially underwrote 
the colonial and oppressive policies of the Dutch in 
Indonesia. 
Only after the survival of the moderate nationalists 
was assured, did the United States start to increase 
pressure on the Dutch for talks. American pressure did not 
translate into effective policy until after the second Dutch 
police action. With NSC-51 American leaders finally looked 
at long term interests in Asia. NATO and Marshall Plan aid 
had begun the reconstruction of Europe. The Brewster 
amendment, of course, would have jeopardized the plan. 
Finally, the United States government took action in favor 
of the Indonesians by threatening to suspend all Dutch aid. 
Months later, Indonesia received its independence. 
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But American cold warriors watched Indonesia closely. 
As they saw it, the cold war must be a managed war. It 
required all nations to have a clear role on one side or the 
other. A bipolar world created win/lose situations and 
America intervened often to promote its interests. 
Indonesia was too important strategically to lose to 
communism. 
Even though Indonesian culture was pre-disposed to 
moderation (Unity in Diversity), exposure to interventions 
and outside pressures extended revolutionary instability. 
Internal disputes, coupled with superpower meddling, would 
retard Indonesian progress toward stability and long term 
growth as a nation. 
Conclusion 
Indonesia was never perceived as a threat or potential 
threat to American security or economic interests. As a 
Dutch colony pursuing independence in the post World War II 
period, it was not viewed as a close friend or ally. 
Although American petroleum and mining interests had 
significant investments in Indonesia, other investors were 
not attracted to the archipelago. This absence meant the 
country's problems never resonated in the American 
consciousness and received little coverage in the American 
media. 
Initial American-Indonesian relations were stormy, but 
it would be unfair to blame only Sukarno for the trouble. 
American policy was often at fault. Indirect American 
support for Dutch military offensives in Indonesia, which in 
turn delayed Indonesian independence, did not bring about 
stability, halt the leftward drift of the Indonesian 
government, or improve the long term prospects for bilateral 
relations. 
While American support for Indonesia eventually led to 
her independence from the Dutch, American actions were not 
motivated by opposition to colonialism. The United States 
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had initially sided with the Netherlands, believing the 
support of an European ally was more dependable and 
important than the support of Asian nationalists. Only when 
the Dutch themselves were the greatest threat to stability 
in Indonesia, and continued Dutch military action threatened 
the ability of the Marshall Plan to pass the Senate owing to 
the Brewster amendment, did America shift its support to the 
Republic. American-European relations, and the American 
military's need for bases in the Pacific, were always the 
paramount considerations of American foreign policy during 
and immediately following World War II and the Korean War. 
American commitment to self-determination for the 
people of Southeast Asia was always limited. The 
development of the cold war meant Washington favored 
gradual, evolutionary changes that supported the 
capitalist/colonialist status quo and limited violence and 
instability. The strategy of the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations was to use American power and prestige to 
liberalize the imperialist system, to nudge European allies 
toward native self-rule, but only at their own pace. 
The emergence of a full blown nationalist movement with 
the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia.by Sukarno and 
Hatta on August 17, 1945, complicated United States 
strategy. Initial American positioning alongside the Dutch 
was unavoidable. A trusted ally and friend of President 
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Roosevelt, the Dutch monarchy was needed to stabilize 
Western Europe in the face of the Soviet threat following 
World War II. The resulting dilemma caused a publicly 
neutral United States to follow a contradictory policy that 
cost much of the goodwill of Indonesian nationalists and 
actually promoted instability in Indonesia while 
contributing to stability in Europe. 
By 1949 NSC-51 crystallized long-run American 
objectives in Southeast Asia. Stating that nineteenth-
century imperialism was no antidote to communism, it 
recommended that the United States support Indonesian 
independence; yet European factors and the cold war outlook 
still dominated American decision making. Finally, Dutch 
intransigence threatened European stability by jeopardizing 
the European Recovery Program in the United States Senate. 
At no point, even when America supported Indonesian 
independence, was State Department policy tied to Asian 
nationalism. 
The unwillingness to allow Indonesian nationalism 
greater influence in United States-Indonesian relations was 
reflected in subsequent American actions in the 1950s. 
These actions decreased chances of a moderate _Indonesian 
government that might abbreviate the period of political 
turmoil and avoid a leftward drift toward communism. 
Sukarno, however manipulative, found himself led, driven and 
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pulled leftward by internal and external forces he could not 
hope to harness, no matter how strong his desire to remain 
in power. American policy had the effect of ensuring long 
term instability. 
In the final analysis, an examination of United States-
Indonesian relations during the years 1945-1949 demonstrates 
the attraction of American ideology. Sukarno and Hatta were 
motivated by American revolutionary principles. The vision 
inspired by these ideals created much goodwill at little 
cost, goodwill that was lost over time by American actions. 
Ideology, as proven by the Reagan administration's 
prosecution of the cold war, can be an inspirational and 
powerful tool to promote the national interests of a nation, 
and cost effective too. In a multipolar world, and in the 
presence of budget cutbacks for the United States, those 
might be wise words indeed. 
As critical as these observations seem, American 
foreign policy made sense. The most important areas 
strategically to the United States were Western Europe, 
China, and Japan, and resources to expend on these goals 
were finite. The stability of these areas remained 
paramount. American strategy often seemed at .odds with 
Indonesian national interests, but it was American pressure 
on the Dutch that did enable her independence. While the 
State Department initially favored the Dutch position, 
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continuing to do so for a protracted period of time, 
American foreign policy experts ultimately changed tactics 
and strongly encouraged the Dutch to return to the 
bargaining table by threatening to suspend European Recovery 
Program aid. At no point were relations allowed to 
deteriorate to the extent that they did in French Indochina. 
Yet this American attempt to practice "realpolitik" had 
its drawbacks. Indonesia provides an excellent case study 
in the negative effects even carefully calculated foreign 
policy strategies bring about. All policy has positive and 
negative consequences. American policy in Indonesia 
reflected concern for European stability and a desire to 
halt the spread of communist influence. American policy 
makers made mistakes, but ultimately these were 
surmountable. The United States-Indonesian relationship was 
one of calculated risks and negative consequences in the 
American pursuit of an overall strategy of containment in 
the cold war period that happily did not degenerate into 
military conflict and disaster. 
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